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CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION
AND THE CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Larry Catá Backer† and Keren Wang ††
Abstract: China is developing its own distinctive path towards socialist
constitutionalism and rule of law, one that reflects China's history and its unique
circumstances but also conforms to the general principles of transnational
constitutionalism. The Chinese constitutional order is grounded on a principal of
separation of powers that distinguishes between an administrative power assigned to the
government and a political authority assigned to the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).
This constitutional order is reflected in two related but distinct legal contexts—laojiao
(the system of administrative detentions, re-education through labor, or “劳动教养”) and
shuanggui (the system of intra-CCP discipline of its cadres, “ 双 规 ”). This article
develops a theory of Chinese socialist constitutionalism though an examination of these
structures for extra-judicial detention. On the basis of this reading of Chinese socialist
constitutionalism, it will suggest why laojiao is constitutionally problematic, but
shuanggui is constitutionally sound under the current Chinese constitutional framework.
Laojiao deals with general conduct obligations of individuals imposed through, and fully
subject to, the administrative order established under the leadership of the CCP,
elaborated through the State Constitution. Deviation therefrom breaches both the State
Constitution and the CCP’s mass line. Shuanggui deals with political rather than
administrative breaches that touch on the integrity of the role of the CCP as Party in
Power. It is in this sense beyond the competence of the administrative authorities
represented by the government apparatus and relates to the constitution of the CCP rather
than the constitution of the state and its administrative authority over the people. As a
consequence, the shuanggui system is not subject to the same constitutional difficulties as
laojiao. Legitimacy is not perfection, and the article ends with a consideration of the
ways in which shuanggui might be reformed to better conform with the CCP’s own
organizational line and its constitutional principles.
†
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INTRODUCTION

Extra-judicial or administrative detention by the state, laojiao, 1 has
raised important issues of constitutionalism in China. The related practice of
extra-judicial detention by the CCP, shuanggui, 2 have raised equally
important issues about the relationship between the CCP, the state, and the
nature of constitutionalism in China. In both cases, the issues can be
understood as focusing on two principal questions. The first goes to the
constitutional legitimacy of laojiao and shuanggui. Legitimacy implicates
the ways in which Chinese constitutionalism itself fits within emerging
global notions of constitutional legitimacy, that is, whether China is a
legitimately constitutional state. The second assumes the constitutional
legitimacy of each practice, but considers whether the implementation of
each system sufficiently conforms to Chinese constitutional requirements.
Constitutional implementation implicates the way in which Chinese
normative principles can constrain the practices of important political
institutions.
The issues of the constitutional legitimacy and constitutional
implementation of laojiao and shuanggui provide an important window for
understanding the normative structures of Chinese constitutionalism and its
distinct basis for the organization of administrative and political power. It is
well understood now that China is developing its own distinctive path
toward socialist constitutionalism and rule of law. 3 Socialist
constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics reflects China’s history and its
unique circumstances, but also conforms to the general principles of

1

“Laojiao” ( 劳 动教养 ) originated in the CCP’s 1955 campaign against counter-revolutionaries.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR (RTL): A SUMMARY OF REGULATORY ISSUES
AND CONCERNS, 1 (2001), available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/hricrtl.pdf. Current legislation dates from 1957, when the NPC Standing Committee authorized the State
Council to administer reeducation through labor. Id. at 2; see infra Part II. For discussion of the AntiRightist Campaigns of 1957-59, see, e.g., René Goldman, The Rectification Campaign at Peking
University: May-June 1957, 12 THE CHINA Q. 138, 138-163 (1962) (China); Frederick C. Teiwes, The
Purge of Provincial Leaders 1957-1958, 27 THE CHINA Q. 14, 14-32 (1966) (China).
2
Shuanggui is the name by which the system of intra-CCP discipline of CCP cadres, or 双规, is
known. It has existed as a means of disciplining CCP cadres since 1927. In its current form, it has become
part of the structures through which politics has been institutionalized in post-Revolutionary China. Thus
institutionalized, Shuanggui is now commonly understood as a Chinese anti-corruption term, translated as
“double designations,” which is used to question Party members being investigated for violating Party
discipline. The plain meaning of the words, according to Gan Yisheng, secretary-general of the CCDI,
suggests that Party members are requested to attend questioning sessions at a designated place and for a
designated duration. See infra Part III through Part V.
3
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 532 (2002).
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transnational constitutionalism. 4 The core premise of the Chinese
constitutionalist order is the relationship between CCP and the state
institutions. 5 The principle of scientific development, solidified as an
important part of the core of the CCP Line, is grounded in the premise that a
successful constitutionalist system not only needs to adhere to core
substantive constitutional principles and norms, but also needs to be a
“living constitution”—one that both reflects socio-political realities present
at hand in order to avoid personification, and also adheres to the CCP’s
foundational mass line.6 In Western political terms, the mass line might thus
be understood as including characteristics of the core democratic principles
of the political organization of the state.
China, like the vast majority of states since the eighteenth century,7
has adopted a written constitution. 8 Like the majority of states, the
legitimacy of its government and governmental actions is assumed to be
judged by or through their conformity to the provisions of that document.9
However, China is also organized on the basis of Marxist-Leninist
principles, which are accorded constitutional effect. 10 Its principal
organizing effect is evidenced in a distinctive approach to separation of
powers. While Western constitutions are grounded in the amalgamation of
all administrative and political authority in a government, whose combined
powers are separated among executive, legislative, and judicial functions,11
the Chinese constitutional order is grounded on a principal of separation of
powers that distinguishes between an administrative power assigned to the
4
See generally, Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study
of Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12, 12-46 (2010).
5
See Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy
of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L. J. 331, 331-408 (2012); Jiang Shigong,
supra note 4, 12-46.
6
Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, 12-46.
7
See, e.g., ZACHERY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 36-64 (2009);
see generally, HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN & GER VAN DER TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS: A
COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978).
8
See XIANFA (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/
constitution.html (last visited March 8, 2014); see also Pu Zengyuan, A Comparative Perspective on the
United States and Chinese Constitutions, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 867, 869 (1989) (stating that: “The
current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 1982. Although labeled a revised
constitution, it is actually a newly drafted one. It reflects the new development of socialist democracy. For
the first time, the new Constitution provides that the building of a high level of democracy is one of the
basic tasks of the state.”).
9
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 17891851 (2005).
10
Zhao Qian, A Thought of Taking CPPCC as Chinese Professional Supervisory Institution of
Unconstitutional Behavior in Applying Law, 7 CAN. SOC. SCI. 71, 71 (2011).
11
Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, HARV. L. REV. 633, 691 (2000).
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government and a political authority assigned to the Chinese Communist
Party.12 Administrative constitutional power is organized within the State
Constitution; the CCP is vested with a leadership through which the political
authority of the people is expressed. 13 Western critics sometimes err by
suggesting that the Chinese approach to constitutionalism is not legitimate
constitutionalism, because the Chinese constitutional system does not
conform to the organizational forms of Western states.14 Chinese academics
sometimes commit the same Western style error in reverse by conceding to
the West the control of the definition of constitutionalism, suggesting that
constitutionalism is itself incapable of universalization because its forms are
grounded in ideological values unique to Western states. Some argue that
any alternative form of constitutionalism, including socialist
constitutionalism, is impossible because these variants do not imitate
Western forms precisely.15
China’s distinctive separation of powers template reflects a normative
foundation for government different from that embraced in Western states.
In Chinese separation of powers approaches, the principles of democracy
and popular sovereignty, understood through the principle of the “mass
line,”16 are divided between an institution with political leadership authority
12
Larry C. Backer, Towards a Robust Theory of the Chinese Constitutional State: Between
Formalism and Legitimacy in Jiang Shigong’s Constitutionalism, (Consortium for Peace and Ethics,
Working Paper No. 5-1, 2013) at 16, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2262555.
13
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen ( 中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), preamble
(China), available at http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188089.html, (stating that
“[l]eadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership.”).
14
See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
11 (2012); but see Michael W. Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan
Zhang, 8 INT. J. CON. L. 977 (2010).
15
Yang Xiaoqing, Xianzheng yu renmin minzhuzhidu zhi bijiao yanjiu (宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究)
[A comparative study of constitutional democracy and the people], 2013 HONGQI WENGAO ISSUE 10, 4 – 10
(May 21, 2013),
available at
http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2013/201310/201305/t20130521
_232618.htm.
16
The “mass line” is a principle with constitutional dimensions. It has been inscribed in the Chinese
State Constitution since 1954. XIANFA art. 17 (1954) (China) provided: “[a]ll organs of state must rely on
the masses of the people, constantly maintain close contact with them, heed their opinions and accept their
supervision.” In its current form it is found in XIANFA art. 27 (1982) (China): “[a]ll state organs and
functionaries must rely on the support of the people, keep in close touch with them, heed their opinions and
suggestions, accept their supervision and work hard to serve them.” The scope is now focused on all
organs of government. The preamble to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party provides: “[t]he
Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task,
carrying out the principle of ‘from the masses, to the masses,’ and translating its correct views into action
by the masses of their own accord.” Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of
the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov.
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(the CCP) and an institution with administrative authority (the government).
Both government and CCP are organized in accordance with their own logic
and within the limits of their authority and function. The government is
organized on the basis of the State Constitution. The State Constitution
provides for the organization of government, 17 commonly understood as
exercised at its highest levels through the State Council and National
People’s Congress (“NPC”) organs and the regulation of the use of
government power, including in relation to the people of China.18 For a long
time, the government, through police officials, has appropriated for itself the
power to administratively detain individuals through a process that bypasses
the standard provisions of criminal and civil law. This laojiao system targets
all citizens, bypasses both prosecutor and court, and is used to police antisocial behaviors, some of which are political in character and some of which
have been criminalized under appropriately authorized action of the NPC.
Laojiao is often referred to as the “Chinese labor camp system” in the West,
and not without good reason.19
The authority of the CCP is acknowledged in the Constitution,20 but is
framed by the ideological premises on which the political order is founded21
—under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng
Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of “Three Represents,” and the
concept of scientific development.22 These describe the normative limits of

14, 2012), preamble (China). Xi Jinping recently relied on the mass line as a critical support for anticorruption efforts. See Raymond Li, Xi looks to legacy of Mao for inspiration to solve corruption, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.scmp.com /news/china/article/1263927/xilooks-legacy-mao-inspiration-solve-corruption.
17
Michael W. Dowdle, Realizing Constitutional Potential, 23 CHINA BUS. REV. 31 (1996).
18
See Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Ruhe caineng jiang quanli guanjin zhidu de longzili (如何才能将权力关进
制 度 的 笼 子 ) [How to Restrict Power in the Cage of Regulations], JUSTICE NETWORK LEGAL
MICROBLOGGING (Feb. 27, 2013), http://libertyzw.fyfz.cn/b/735339 (last visited Feb. 22, 2014), translated
in LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (May 3, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/partxxviiizhiwei-tong-series-how-to.html#more (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
19
Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Labor Camps Widens in China, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/opposition-to-labor-camps-widens-in-china.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=1& (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
20
XIANFA art. 1 (1982) (China).
21
Larry C. Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns:
Sange Daibiao (the “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism,
16 J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 929636.
22
All but the last are expressed in the State Constitution. See XIANFA preamble (2004). All are
acknowledged in the Communist Party Constitution. See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党
章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov.
14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. PROGRAM (China).
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the powers of government and CCP,23 and suggest the structures of deep rule
of law within Chinese constitutionalism, one that is acknowledged as not
fully realized.24 The CCP is organized on the basis of its own constitutional
instrument, and its constitutional role is not specified within the State
Constitution. 25 The leadership role of the CCP includes the authority to
organize itself and to exercise authority over its members.26 This authority
also includes a power to detain CCP members suspected of corruption or
other breaches of discipline, under the shuanggui system. 27 This is
administered almost completely outside the system of government
established through the State Constitution, but within the institutional
framework of the organization of the CCP itself.28
Both laojiao and shuanggui have come under increasing criticism in
China as well as in the Western press. 29 Laojiao has been criticized as
irremediably in conflict with both constitutional protections accorded
individuals and with a number of general laws adopted by Chinese state
Shuanggui has been criticized as extraadministrative organs. 30
constitutional because state organs do not administer it.31 It is also criticized
as failing to conform to the protections afforded individuals under the
23
See Backer, supra note 21; Tong Zhiwei, Abandoning RTL a Critical Step Toward Complete Rule
of Law, SINA.COM (Feb. 5, 2013), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6d8baa340101drap.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2014).
24
Hu Jintao, Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress, Part XII, XINHUA (Nov. 17,
2012), http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540.htm (last visited
March 8, 2014).
25
Tong Zhiwei, supra note 18; Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 12.
26
See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN.
PROGRAM (China).
27
See id. art. 37-42.
28
Larry C. Backer, Communist Party and State Discipline in China: Exploring Shuanggui (双规)
and Shuang kai Part I, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Aug. 2, 2011), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.
com/2011/08/communist-party-and-state-discipline-in.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); see also Larry C.
Backer, Communist Party and State Discipline in China Part II: Brief Introduction to Shuang Kai and Pix
Inside Shuang gui Facility, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 17, 2011),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/communist-party-and-state-discipline-in.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2014).
29
The most notorious criticism of laojiao was an article by the Chinese language magazine, Lens,
which is part of a chain of magazines that includes the well-known business magazine, Caijing. See Adam
Taylor, ‘Tiger Bench’ and Other Horrific Torture Methods Reportedly Used at Chinese Work Camp,
BUSINESS INSIDER: MILITARY AND DEFENSE (April 9, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/allegedtorture-in-chinas-laojiao-2013-4 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). Shuanggui generates substantial coverage in
the Western press. See Jonathan Kaiman, “Fears for China’s Shuanggui detainees After Wenzhou Official
Dies,” THE GUARDIAN (UK) (April 12, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/12/fears-chinashuanggui-detainees (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
30
See infra Part II.
31
See infra Part III.
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Chinese constitution and otherwise applicable law. 32 Recently, Chinese
authorities have indicated an intention to reform or perhaps abolish the
laojiao system.33 There has been no indication of any intention to change
the shuanggui system, though it remains subject to censure especially with
respect to the way in which it is applied. Laojiao and shuanggui represent
both an expression of constitutional authority within a system in which
power is separated between administrative and political functions, and a
useful means for examining the character and structures of Chinese
constitutionalism.
The article seeks to scientifically develop34 a way of understanding
the form and character of the Chinese constitutional system by examining
laojiao and shuanggui in the context of the Chinese State-Party
constitutional system. 35 Part II analyzes laojiao within the Chinese
constitutional system. It starts with a formal description of laojiao from
within China, continues with an analysis of the constitutional critique of
laojiao, and argues that under the scientific development of Chinese
constitutionalism, laojiao no longer accords with Chinese constitutional
norms. In addition, laojiao no longer accords with the political guidance of
the CCP, and especially the “mass line.” Together with the “mass line” and
under the guidance of the CCP, a state apparatus must be formed and
maintained for the people. Laojiao targets the masses, and in that sense
duplicates and to some extent subverts the administrative order created
through the governmental system founded on the Chinese Constitution,
which itself reflects the CCP Line. As an extra-judicial form of
administrative discipline directly against the masses, the laojiao system not
only violates constitutional principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP's

32

See infra Part III.
Liu Yuanhui, Abolition of Re-Education Through Labor a Milestone, CRI ENGLISH (Nov. 15,
2013), http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/12/28/2561s805553.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (noting that
“[o]n Nov 15, 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee issued its
resolutions to implement a long list of comprehensive reforms. Among the reforms is the abolition of the
controversial ‘re-education through labor’ policy, abbreviated as laojiao in Chinese. The move has been
hailed, both at home and abroad, as a milestone in the development of China's legal sector.”).
34
This is a deliberate reference to the Chinese constitutional principle of scientific development, put
forward at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th CCP National Congress in 2003. See XIANFA preamble
(1982) (China); Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen ( 中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist
Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012),
preamble (China); Scientific Concept of Development & Harmonious Society, COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA, 17TH NAT’L CONG., (2007) (China), http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
35
Cf. Michael W. Dowdle Constitutional Listening, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115, 135 (2012).
33
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mass line. It is unnecessary and poses a major roadblock to the development
of a CCP-led harmonious socialist society under the guidance of rule-of-law.
Shuanggui is different from laojiao, and the article then turns to a
consideration of shuanggui within Chinese constitutionalism. Parts III
through V thus focus on the basis for that difference between shuanggui and
laojiao, and then develop the basis for a constitutional defense of shuanggui
and its critical importance to understanding Chinese constitutionalism from
out of that difference. Though some of the techniques associated with IntraParty discipline may be similar to the laojiao system, shuanggui serves a
very different purpose. Shuanggui deals with political rather than
administrative breaches that touch on the integrity of the role of the CCP as
Party in Power. It is in this sense beyond the competence of the
administrative authorities represented by the government apparatus and
relates to the constitution of the CCP rather than the constitution of the state
and its administrative authority over the people. As a consequence, the
shuanggui system is not subject to the same constitutional difficulties as
laojiao, but may benefit from scientific development under China’s rule of
law constitutional system.
This application serves as the means through which we elaborate our
theory of the Chinese characteristics of constitutionalism: the Chinese
constitutional order is founded on a separation of powers framework that is
quite distinct from that embraced in the West. In place of the allocation of
all political and administrative authority in a government, the powers of
which are then divided among executive, legislative and judicial branches,
the Chinese constitutional system separates power among a political order,
defined by the CCP’s constitution, conventions and practices vested in the
CCP, and an administrative order, defined by the State constitution, laws,
regulations and practices, and vested in this more narrow sense in the
government of China.
Part III starts with a formal description of the shuanggui system from
within. It then considers critically the constitutional attacks on the
legitimacy of shuanggui, and its conventional justification under or around
the State Constitution. Part IV then elaborates our theory of Chinese
constitutionalism within the context of shuanggui. It considers the
difficulties of defending shuanggui on the basis of conventional analysis
without fully considering the place and legitimacy of the CCP within
Chinese constitutionalism. The paper will suggest, ultimately, that it is quite
plausible to understand laojiao as no longer falling within the administrative
limits of the government as expressed in the State Constitution, but that
shuanggui as legitimate and falling within the legal limits of scientifically
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developing Chinese constitutionalism. Both conclusions are possible only
when one understands Chinese constitutionalism in its comprehensive and
systemic context. That understanding, in turn, is based on an appreciation of
the constitutional role of the CCP and of Marxist Leninist and Mao Zedong
thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and the Three Represents in providing the
substantive basis of the Chinese constitutional system. 36 In this context,
shuanggui is essential for the performance by the CCP of its own
constitutional obligations according to the premises of its own constitution
and thus subject to law under the State Constitution.
Once the legitimacy of shuanggui is thus properly understood, one
can move from the false issue of its legitimacy (embedded within the larger
issue of the legitimacy of the current Chinese constitutional system itself) to
the far more important one of the appropriate construction of shuanggui and
its implementation as a device of Party discipline in light of Chinese
constitutional principles, but outside the jurisdiction of any government
ministry or court. That is the object of Part V. It begins a preliminary
consideration of the issue of the constitutional obligations of the CCP in the
construction and implementation of shuanggui. The path to understanding
the real character of the Chinese constitutional system lies in an
understanding of laojiao and shuanggui.
II.

LAOJIAO AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION

In 2012, reports began circulating of an intention by the NPC to
consider the elimination of the laojiao system.37 For example, China Daily
reported that:
Ying Yong, president of Shanghai High People’s Court
. . . noted in a proposal submitted during this year’s NPC
session, held in March in Beijing, that the system has
contributed greatly to social order and improved economic
development. Even so, the country finds itself amid different
circumstances than were present fifty years ago and has
established a legal system. Laojiao should therefore be
modified, he said.38

36

See generally Backer, supra note 21; Backer, supra note 5.
Zhao Yining, Lawyers Calling for Reform of Laojiao System, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-08/16/content_15679394.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
38
Id.
37
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Indeed, public criticism of the system had been increasing, especially in light
of recent cases of abuse of the administrative detention provisions by local
officials. 39 Recently released detained persons have begun to seek
compensation for their detention, though to date unsuccessfully.40 Almost a
year later, the Communist Party, through its Third Plenum of the 18th Party
Congress, indicated that laojiao would be phased out and eventually
eliminated. The movement from strong institutional support in the 1950s
through eventual elimination suggests a significant scientific development of
the Chinese constitutional system. 41 We will suggest here that laojiao
seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is currently operated, and on
that basis alone it must either be abolished or reformed. Section A of this
Part II will briefly consider recent developments in the organization and
deployment of laojiao. Section B will then turn to an examination of the
laojiao system itself. Section C then considers the constitutionality of
laojiao within the parameters of Chinese socialist constitutionalism.
A.

Recent Developments

By the end of 2013, there appeared to be a political consensus that the
laojiao system was to be abolished.42 This was not the first time that the
laojiao system has been on the brink of abolition. In 2003 at the start of Hu
Jintao’s first term, “127 people’s representatives to the National People’s
Congress proposed motions to reform laojiao, and the NPC Legislative
Affairs Commission began to produce a draft law titled ‘Law for the
Education and Correction of Illegal Conduct’ (weifa xingwei jiaozhi fa) that
would have eliminated laojiao as an administrative punishment.”43 But by
39
Deng Shasha, China to reform Re-Education Through Labor System, XINHUA (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/07/c_132086402.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
40
In one case involving a woman detained after seeking greater punishment for the people who
abducted, raped, and prostituted her eleven-year-old daughter, an intermediate People’s Court refused to
award compensation. Zhao Yining, supra note 37. In another case, the city's laojiao committee turned
down Tang's previous request for compensation of CNY 2,400, arguing the decision “was withdrawn not
because it was wrong, but out of humanitarian concerns.” Id.
41
Yang Yi, China Focus: China’s ‘Laojiao’ site to change role after abolishment, XINHUA (Nov.
17, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/17/c_132895129.htm (last visited Feb. 2014)
(quoting Wang Qiliang, associate dean of Law School in Yunnan University, stating that “[t]he reeducation
through labor system has accomplished its historical mission. China has a much improved legal system
now”).
42
China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891922.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
43
Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Criminal Procedure: An Introduction to This Symposium,
24 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 213, 218 n. 8 (2011).
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the end of 2003, momentum for abolition had stalled on the opposition of the
Ministry of Public Security.44
The Chinese authorities again signaled the possible abolishment of its
controversial laojiao system during the National Conference on
Procuratorial, Judicial, and Public Security Affairs that took place in Beijing
earlier in 2013. According to several major Chinese news sources, Meng
Jianzhu, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Commission,
announced during the National Conference that “the re-education through
labor system will be terminated by the end of this year upon approval from
National People’s Congress Standing Committee. 45 In addition, “[i]n
October, Zhou Qiang, President of the Supreme People’s Court, China’s top
judicial body, urged courts nationwide to “take concerted action” in aiding
laojiao reform by streamlining court hearing procedures for minor offenses
and promoting the use of community correction to better rehabilitate
criminals.”46
Secretary Meng’s comment signaled a critical development. It comes
at a time when the laojiao system is receiving increasing public scrutiny
following several well-publicized scandals relating to the use of extrajudicial detention by local governments against “contumacious”
individuals.47 Although the Xinhua news agency later replaced terminate
with further reform the laojiao system in its official report of the National
Conference,48 subsequent development nonetheless supports the speculation
that China’s central government is committed to phasing out its half-century
old labor camp system. 49 On February 5th, the Yunnan provincial
government announced that Yunnan Province would no longer approve cases
in which people are sent to re-education labor camps on grounds of
44

Id.
Quanguo Zhengfa Gongzuo Huiyi: Jinnian Tingzhi Shiyong Laojiao Zhidu (全国政法工作会议:今年
停止使用劳教制度) [National Conference on Procuratorial, Judicial and Public Security Affairs: Terminating
http://news.china.com/domestic
Laojiao System This Year], CHINA.COM (Jan. 7, 2012),
/945/20130107/17618589.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
46
Yin Pumin, Ending an Outdated System, BEIJING REVIEW, (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2013-12/02/content_580796_2.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
47
Lilian Lin, Mother’s Labor-Camp Sentence Sparks Fury, THE WALL STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/08/06/mother%E2%80%99s-labor-camp-sentence-sparks-fury/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing a case where “[t]he plight of a mother sentenced to a labor camp for
demanding tougher punishment for those who allegedly raped and forced her daughter into prostitution has
rallied China’s online community — and even prompted an official rebuke from the Communist Party’s
main mouthpiece.”).
48
Tong Zhiwei, supra note 23.
49
Id. (noting that “although a Xinhua news dispatch later that day replaced ‘stop using’ with ‘further
advance the RTL system reform’ it did not deny that recently the central government has decided to go
with the historical trend and popular wish for the gradual discard of the RTL system”).
45
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threatening national security, petitioning by causing unrest, and smearing the
image of officials.50 The Secretary of Yunnan’s Politics and Law Committee
told reporters that the laojiao approval process has been suspended for all
cases within the province.51 It is probable that other provinces will follow
the lead of Yunnan and Guangdong provinces in abolishing the use of
laojiao and repurposing those facilities. The extent of those changes will
depend, in turn, on the direction and scope of reform that is finally set as
state policy by the CCP and as law by the NPC.
That direction and scope became clearer in November 2013. On
November 15th, 2013, the CCP released a key policy document
summarizing the economic and political reforms approved by the Third
Plenary Session of the eighteenth CCP Central Committee.52 The document
specifically mentions judicial reforms, calling for a “fair, efficient and
authoritative socialist judicial system” for the purpose of “safeguarding the
rights and legitimate interests of the people.” 53 It stresses the need to
“uphold the constitution and laws, deepen reforms in administrative law
enforcement, and ensure independence and fairness in prosecuting bodies
and courts.” 54 Most significantly, the document announced the plan to
abolish the laojiao system as a part of the major effort to improve judicial
practice and protection of human rights.55
On the basis of this CCP policy document, the NPC system has also
begun to move forward on reform. At its bi-monthly session in December
2013, the NPC began consideration of a bill to eliminate laojiao.56 The bill
50

Chen Weijun, Guangdong and Yunnan Announce the Abolition of Forced Labor Camps (Laojiao),
ASIANEWS.IT (July 2, 2013), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Guangdong-and-Yunnan-announce-theabolition-of-forced-labor-camps-%28laojiao%29-27072.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
51
Yunnan Zanting Sanzhong Xingwei Laojiao Shenpi: Chouhua Lingdaoren Xingxiang Buzai
Laojiao ( 云南暂停三种行为劳教审批: 丑化领导人形象不再劳教 ) [Yunnan Suspends Three Types of Laojiao
Approval, Including Smearing the Image of Political Leaders], XINHUA (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2013-02/07/c_124332693.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
52
China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, supra note 42.
53
Id.
54
China to Overhaul Judicial System: Communique, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/12/c_132882473.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
55
China to Abolish Reeducation Through Labor, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891921.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014)
(quoting Wang Gongyi, former senior researcher with the Ministry of Justice, as stating “in practice there
are no rigid procedures to regulate how the committee should decide the criminal facts and the application
of punishment.”); see also China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, supra note 42. For the original Xinhua
report, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c _132891922.htm.
56
NPC Addresses Laojiao System at Bi-Monthly Session, WANT CHINA TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013)
(Taiwan), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131224000134&cid=1101 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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was sponsored by the Chinese State Council.57 It calls for the elimination of
laojiao in its current form because it was no longer necessary.58 It was also
reported that:
“[o]nce laojiao is abolished, relevant laws, judicial
interpretations, and documents will be adjusted accordingly. The State
Council will organize departments to administer the annulment of the
system, including setting free those still in labor camps, reassigning police in
charge of laojiao, and changing the function of locations to other
purposes.”59
It is important to note that although the laojiao system is markedly
coming to an end, the future role of existing laojiao facilities across China
and their personnel remain uncertain. Western commentators have also
suggested caution, noting that the Article 73 Revised Criminal Procedure
Law continues to permit house arrest under a set of broad criteria and that
detention in places other than the home will still be permitted for “crimes
endangering state security, crimes of terrorism and particularly serious
crimes of bribery.” 60 In addition, it is not clear that related detention
measures, laogai (reform through labor), juiye (forced job placement),
hourong shencha (shelter and investigation), custody and repatriation laws,
juvenile offender camps, and psychiatric hospitals laws will be reformed.61
Moreover, the resolution of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress
indicated that it was also imperative to “enhance the community correction
system.”62
Despite these concerns, the conventional architecture of the laojiao
system appears to be on the brink of reform.
Shortly after the
57

Id.
Id. (noting that “[t]he bill holds that constant improvement to the legal system has made laojiao
superfluous to the nation’s current legal setup”).
59
Id.
60
Stanley Lubman, Will Re-Education Through Labor End Soon?, THE WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4,
2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/02/04/will-re-education-through-labor-end-soon/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
61
For a short description of these measures, see LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, LAOGAI
HANDBOOK 16-23 (2008), available at http://laogai.org/system/files/u1/handbook2008-all.pdf.
62
See Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (explaining that the Ministry of Justice is
drafting a new Community Correction Law that will serve as a means of undertaking the supervision of a
host of former prisoners in China); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan, Gonganbu,
Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa ‘Shequ Jiaozheng Shishi Banfa’ de Tongzhi’ (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院、公安部、司
法 部 关 于 印 发 《 社 区 矫 正 实 施 办 法 》 的 通 知 ) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice Regarding Issue of Implementation
Measures for Community Correction] (Jan. 10, 2012), translated in Community Correction Expands as
RTL Contracts, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/12/
community-correction-expands-as-rtl.html (last visited March 24, 2014).
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announcement, the official Xinhua news reported that laojiao institutions
across China are seeking new roles after the decision to abolish the
reeducation through labor (“RTL”) system. 63 For instance, the former
laojiao center of reeducation through labor in Xishuangbanna Dai
Autonomous Prefecture in southwest Yunnan is set to be transformed into a
drug rehab center. 64 According to the Director of the Justice Bureau of
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, the key to the functional
transformation of the former laojiao institutions is “to advocate a greater
role for the local society, based on the existing infrastructure.” 65 These
recent developments provide important background for the abolishment and
ongoing reforms of the laojiao system.
B.

The Laojiao System in a Legal Context

The term “laojiao” is an abbreviation of “laodong jiaoyang (劳动教
养 ),” which literally translates as “reeducation through labor.” Laojiao
targets those individuals who have committed “minor offences” that do not
amount to criminal liability. 66 It is a compulsory administrative penal
system that seeks to “reform and correct” those individuals through forced
labor and detention.67 Professor Tong emphasizes the administrative nature
of the laojiao system and its avoidance of the constitutional safeguards for
criminal prosecutions and bypass of the judicial system and its safeguards.68
This is ironic, especially when it has been reported that “RTL detainees are
mostly treated just like prisoners in the criminal justice system, although
now, unlike in the past, they are generally segregated from inmates
convicted of criminal offenses.” 69 Moreover, according to “reports from
political detainees and others, conditions in RTL camps are generally
abusive, with overcrowded, unsanitary living conditions; inadequate food;
endemic violence; and excessive working hours being among the major
63

Yang Yi, supra note 41; see also Petitioner's Account of RTL Reforms, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J.
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www .duihuahrjournal.org/2013/11/petitioners-account-of-rtl-reforms.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
64
Laojiao site to change role after abolishment, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 17, 2013),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/17/content_17111104.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (noting
that Xishuangbanna borders on Myanmar and Laos, as well as the Golden Triangle—one of the world’s
major sources of drugs. The geographic location of Xishuangbanna may play a significant role in the
decision to transform the former laojiao camp into a drug rehab center.).
65
Id.
66
LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.
67
See generally, Tong Zhiwei, supra note 23.
68
Id.
69
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1.
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concerns.”70 Indeed, some have suggested that the prison enterprises might
be incompatible with the market economy and might hinder modernization.71
Nationwide, there are now close to 300 RTL centers, according to official
statistics.72
Laojiao received its present name from the 1957 ordinance titled
“Resolution on Approving the Decision of the State Council on the Issue of
the Reeducation through Labor.” 73 The 1957 resolution remains the
principle document providing the legal basis for the laojiao system,
stipulating as its objective: “[i]n accordance with Article 100 of the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, for the purpose of reforming
those idling, law-breaking, discipline-breaching, duty-neglecting but workcapable individuals into self-reliant people of new work ethic.”74
Paragraph V of the 1957 regulation provides that laojiao authorities
are established by the provincial level governments, and the entire laojiao
process is handled by the local civil affairs and public security
departments. 75 This was modified in 1979 when the NPC Standing
Committee approved “Supplementary Provisions by the State Council on
Reeducation through Labor” in 1979. 76 The Supplementary Provisions
established Reeducation Through Labor Management Committees (劳动教
养管理委员会) as the sole organ responsible for reviewing and approving
laojiao cases.77 The regulations do not require these committees to release
70

Id.
Yang Liangqing & Wang Yijun, interview with Liu Shien, Jianqi fenkai hou jianyu shengcha
dingwei de sikao, (司法部部长谈监狱体制改革：让监狱告别营利) [Some Thoughts on Prison Production after the
http://www.southcn.com
Separation of Prison and Enterprise], SOUTHCN.COM (Dec. 5, 2003),
/news/community/shzt/prison/outline/200405101067.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014), cited in LAOGAI
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.
72
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 31-33.
73
BUREAU OF REEDUCATION-THROUGH-LABOR ADMIN., Zhongguo Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Jianjie
( 中 国 劳 动 教 养 制 度 简 介 ) [Introduction to China’s Reeducation Through Labor System] (2002)
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/ldjyglj/2003-05/28/content_19622.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). Some
trace the origins of the system to the 1954 “Regulations on Reform Through Labor.” See LAOGAI
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.
74
Guowuyuan guanyu laodongjiaoyang wenti de jueding (国务院关于劳动教养问题的决定) [Resolution
on Approving the Decision of the State Council on the Issue of the Reeducation through Labor] (approved
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Aug. 1, 1957), section 1 [hereinafter Resolution]. Article 10
of the Ministry of Public Security’s 1982 trial practices on re-education through labor listed six categories
that refine those of the 1957 Resolution, lumping labor insubordination together with counterrevolutionary
activity and pretty criminality. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1.
75
Resolution, supra note 74.
76
LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.
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Guowuyuan guanyu laodongjiaoyang de buchong jueding (国务院关于劳动教养的补充规定)
[Supplementary Provisions by the State Council on Reeducation through Labor] (approved by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Nov. 19, 1979).
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written opinions to explain how decisions in individual cases were made.78
Neither the courts nor the People’s procuratorate are involved in the laojiao
process.
Laojiao appears to have been developed as a tool of the political,
social, and economic reorganization of China in the first decades after the
establishment of the People’s Republic. It served as a means of political
control of non-Party members, especially during the period of the AntiRightist Campaigns,79 as well as to discipline the labor force during an initial
period of Soviet style collectivization.80 But it also had some connection to
political notions underlying the people’s democratic dictatorship at the heart
of the Socialist Party-State. 81 Laojiao eventually evolved to serve four
principal functions: controlling political dissidents, maintaining public
order, facilitating police criminal investigations, and suppressing drug use by
addicts. 82 It thus combined political and social order elements that have
since clouded its scope and function as the Chinese state apparatus
developed, especially after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, as the
political control elements of laojiao became less prominent, the public
security departments further expanded the scope of the laojiao system to
include drug addicts, prostitutes, and compulsive gamblers. 83 Habitual
offenders became an important element in the 1970s, as were suspects

78
Jaime A. FlorCruz, Reforming China’s Controversial Labor Camps, CNN (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:48
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/asia/china-forced-labor-camps/ (quoting a Beijing lawyer, that
“current regulations do not require the laojiao management committees to release a written verdict to
explain how their decisions were made, so it is difficult to know if a decision was fair”).
79
See Resolution, supra note 74, section 1; see also, Amy Li, ‘Not a single person’ persecuted in the
Anti-Rightist Movement, says vice director of CASS, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 14, 2013),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1237558/not-single-person-persecuted-anti-rightist-movementsays-vice-director (last visited March 6, 2014) (explaining that “[t]he Anti-Rightist Movement, which
lasted from 1957 to 1959, consisted of campaigns to purge alleged rightists within the Communist Party
both in China and abroad. The term “rightists” was largely used to refer to intellectuals accused of favoring
capitalism over collectivization.”).
80
Fu Hualing, Dissolving Laojiao at 2 (University of Hong Kong, Working Paper, April 27, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395552.
81
In 1987, Deng Yuzhen wrote: “[a] socialist state’s Laogai facilities . . . as an important
component of the people’s democratic dictatorship, Laogai facilities of all levels are established- prisons,
Laogai camps, Laojiao camps, and juvenile criminal camps, all of them are tools representing the interests
of the proletariat and the masses exercising dictatorship over a minority of hostile elements originating
from exploiter classes.” LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.
82
Id.
83
Wang Yijun, Laojiao zhidu gaige zaina (劳教制度改革难在哪) [What are the Difficulties for Laijiao
Reforms], CHINA YOUTH DAILY 11 (September 6, 2012) available at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/201209/06/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120906_2-11.htm.
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against which insufficient evidence could be accumulated, and since the
1980s, drug users.84
Before 1979, detention was for an indefinite period, with some reports
of detentions for several decades.85 The Supplementary Provisions provided
for detention of individuals in laojiao labor camps for up to four years.
Currently, detentions are fixed at one to three years with a possible
additional year extension, with extensive regulations developed by the
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice covering the
operation of the system.86
C.

The Constitutionality of Laojiao

The policy shifts and criticism of the laojiao system suggest the value
of considering its legitimacy, as formally developed, under the constraints of
the Chinese constitutional system. This section examines laojiao from a
constitutional perspective. It starts with an analysis of the conformity of the
law of laojiao to the obligations imposed on the state apparatus under the
Chinese constitutions as adopted from 1954. It suggests that while the
objectives of the laojiao system fall clearly within the constitutional
authority of the state apparatus, there is no direct authority for the means
chosen to operationalize the laojiao system as adopted. The administration
and implementation of the laojiao system became more constitutionally
problematic after the adoption of the 1982 State Constitution. The section
then considers the possibility that laojiao can be defended as a species of the
controversial doctrine of constitutional necessity. But that argument is
rejected as incompatible with the Chinese constitutional system itself and
increasingly viewed as illegitimate as a constitutional device. The
contradictions between necessity and the rule of law premise built into the
1982 State Constitution is explored. But this traditional Western style
constitutional analysis does not end the matter. Under core premises of
Chinese Constitutionalism, the interpretation of the legitimacy of laojiao is
also dependent on an analysis of that system for its conformity to the CCP
line—that is, the fundamental principles of political leadership through
which the CCP undertakes its leadership role. A review of Chinese
84
Fu Hualing, supra note 80, at 3. For useful statistics on this last point, see id. at 4. Fu notes
further that the reform of Laojiao was to some extent tied to the efforts to reform Chinese drug laws. Id. at
4-5. Fu argues that with the reform of the drug laws the utility of Laojiao has been substantially eroded,
thus the opening for reform. Id. at 6.
85
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 2.
86
Id. at 3.
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constitutional principles—scientific development, the mass line, and the
principles of people’s democratic dictatorship—suggests that laojiao
seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is currently articulated.
The 1957 Resolution formalizing the laojiao system was supposedly
adopted “in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China.”87 That Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,
enacted in 1954, 88 was subsequently revised in 1975, 1978, and 1982. 89
Article 100 of the 1954 Constitution provides that: “[c]itizens of the
People’s Republic of China must abide by the Constitution and the law,
uphold discipline at work, keep public order and respect social ethics.”90
Article 100 became Article 53 in the current 1982 version of the
Constitution, and the language of the article remains substantially
unchanged. 91 Article 53 describes the basic duties of citizens; and it
suggests a basis for the legitimacy of many of the objectives of laojiao. But
it does not explicitly provide authority for exercise of the means by which
the state may exercise authority to ensure compliance with these citizen
obligations. The means for such exercise of authority, then, if exercised by
the state apparatus, must be found in other provisions of the State
Constitution. But it is unlikely that any such support can be found.
Indeed, in the absence of interpretive gap-filling, there is little by way
of direct authority for the means chosen to operationalize laojiao in its
current form. The 1954 State Constitution characterizes work as a “matter
of honor,” and the State is empowered to encourage citizens to “take an
active and creative part in their work.” 92 More importantly, while the
principles of people’s democratic dictatorship might have found expression
in the 1954 State Constitution’s authorization of the State organs to
“suppress all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities” 93 and to

87
Resolution, (promulgated by the 78th meeting of the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Aug. 1, 1957), available at http://www.hrichina.org/chs/jue-ding/guo-wu-yuan-guan-yu-lao-dong-jiaoyang-wen-ti-de-jue-ding.
88
XIANFA art. 100, 17 (1954) (China), available at http://www.hkpolitics.net/database/chicon/1954
/1954ae.pdf.
89
See, e.g., William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.
REV. 707, 711-14 (1985), available at http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2203&context=lawreview.
90
See XIANFA art. 17 (1954) (China).
91
See XIANFA, art. 53 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html (requiring citizens to abide by the constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect
public property, observe labour discipline and public order, and respect social ethics.).
92
XIANFA, art. 16 (1954) (China).
93
Id. at art. 19.
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deprive certain classes of individuals of political rights,94 “at the same time it
provides them with a way to earn a living in order to enable them to reform
through work.”95 However, Article 89 of the 1954 State Constitution also
prohibited arrest “except by decision of a people’s court or with the sanction
of a people’s procuratorate.”96
Thus, while it might have been possible to develop a laojiao system
within constitutional norms, such efforts would necessarily fall within the
scope of Article 89, something to which the laojiao regulations failed to
conform. By citing Article 100 (now 53) of the 1954 State Constitution, the
1957 Regulation implies that the administrative apparatus may forcefully
deprive a citizen’s personal freedom for the purpose of enforcing work
discipline or promoting social ethics, even when the given individual is
without any criminal liability or has committed a minor offense that does not
amount to incarceration under the criminal code. Such disciplinary system
is markedly problematic, as both 1954 and 1982 versions of the Chinese
Constitution offer protection from arrest and detention without judicial
process for Chinese citizens. Article 89 of the 1954 Constitution provides
that: “[f]reedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China
is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people’s
court or with the sanction of a People’s Procuratorate.”97 Article 37 of the
1982 Constitution also confirmed the due process requirement.98 Moreover,
Article 19 of the 1954 State Constitution was reformed and appears now as
Article 28 of the 1982 State Constitution, limiting the power to punish
political actions through the criminal law.99 Yet Article 1 of the 1982 State
94

Id. (specifically designed to deprive feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of certain rights).
Id.
96
Id. at art. 89.
97
Id.
98
See XIANFA, art. 37 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html (providing that “[t]he freedom of person of citizens of the People's Republic of China is
inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate or
by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation
or restriction of citizens' freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search
of the person of citizens is prohibited.”).
99
Article 28 of the 1982 State Constitution originally provided that the “[s]tate maintains public
order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that
endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and
reforms criminals.” XIANFA, art. 28 (1982) (China). This article was amended in 1999 to provide that the
“[s]tate maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities; it
penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal
activities, and punishes and reforms criminals.” In either case, it appears clear that these political acts,
when undertaken by individuals other than members of the CCP are to be treated under the criminal law
and the regular structures for the institutionalization thereof through the State Constitution and the laws
enacted thereunder. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzhengan ( 中 华 人 民共 和 国 宪 法修 正 案 )
95
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Constitution still speaks to a blanket prohibition against political subversion
of the socialist system, though there is no indication that this prohibition
would be treated differently from other forms of criminality, including
treason.100
Against the explicitly written language from Article 37 is the fact that
the entire reeducation through labor process is without judicial review and
completely bypasses all judicial organs of the state, such as the People’s
Court and People’s Procuratorate. 101 Furthermore, Article 5 of the State
Constitution imposes strict duty for state organs to adhere to constitutional
principles. 102 Equally important, to the extent that the laojiao system is
grounded in political discipline of the people, for example through the
original focus on anti-social and counter-revolutionary elements, it falls
outside the powers of state organs and implicates the authority of the CCP,
except to the extent it is transposed into law through the procedures
specified in the State Constitution.103 In the absence of a designation as an
administrative offense under the civil or criminal law, the government itself
under the State Constitution would be obligated to defer to the CCP, but
would be unable to reach individuals directly, consistent with Article 37 of
the 1982 State Constitution.
In addition, a number of administrative and personal abuses have been
reported. Beyond its extra-judicial administration of avoiding procedural
protection afforded under the criminal law, critics have suggested that the
scope of laojiao is unacceptably vague.104 It is broad enough to provide
[Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], (adopted by Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress, 1999), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=433 (last visited
March 1, 2014).
100
XIANFA, art. 1 (1982) (China) available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html (providing that “[t]he socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of
China. Sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”).
101
See, e.g., LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61; cf. Lin Min, An Archaic Form of
DAILY
(Aug.
13,
2012),
http://www.szdaily.com/content/2012Justice,
SHENZHEN
08/13/content_7069313.htm (last visited March 1, 2014).
102
See XIANFA art. 5 (1982) (China) available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html (stating that “[n]o law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene
the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all
enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the
Constitution and the law must be investigated. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of
being above the Constitution and the law.”).
103
XINFA art. 28 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html.
104
See generally, KLAUS MÜHLHAHN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: A HISTORY 216-17 (2009); cf.
John Givens, Laojiao Terrorism of China, BEFORE IT’S NEWS (June 11, 2013),
http://beforeitsnews.com/international/2013/06/laojiao-terrorism-of-china-2459950.html (last visited March
1, 2014); Lin Min, supra note 101.
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local officials with cover to punish anyone, the penalties under laojiao are
harsher than those provided for similar crimes under the criminal law, local
authorities have added their own regulations making the rules incoherent,
and the facilities and treatment of laojiao detainees are worse than those in
penal facilities.105 More troubling is the essence of laojiao administration—
it is operated by the local police without oversight by the procurate or the
courts.106 In effect, the laojiao system itself is essentially beyond any power
granted to any administrative organ established within the government
established through the State Constitution. Laojiao effectively creates a
penal system that bypasses the careful structures of constitutional restraints
and in the process also breaches the basic separation of powers at the heart
of Chinese constitutionalism.
Even if one were inclined to accept this line of reasoning, it might still
be possible to construct a constitutional argument supporting laojiao based
on a species of the controversial doctrine of constitutional necessity, one
which justified subordinating rule of law to action necessary to preserve the
political and social order.107 Necessity would have to be framed around the
need to establish the power of the state and to ensure that the ruling ideology
was not subject to undermining by people dedicated to regime change within
a state only recently emerging from nearly a century of turmoil,108 a state
which still faced substantial opposition from militarily powerful states
inalterably opposed to the political premises on which the new government
was established,109 and to its territorial ambitions.110 In that context, it might
be essential to treat citizens as potential enemy combatants and to move
105

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1.
Mark Magnier, China Thinks of Closing its Reeducation Prisons, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 5,
2007), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/05/world/fg-reeducate5.
107
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity 1 THIRD
WORLD Q. 97, 110 (1979). On the tension between perceived rule of law and necessity in constitutional
states, see generally Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1243 (2012).
108
See, e.g., LI CHIEN-NUNG, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA 1840-1928 8-11 (Ssu-Yu Teng &
Jeremy Ingalls trans., 1956).
109
See, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 113TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT 138-42 (Comm. Print
2013), available at http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/AR13DJ.PDF; cf. Kristen
A. Stilt, Constitutional Authority and Subversion: Egypt's New Presidential Election System, 16 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006) (observing “[m]ost recent scholarship on constitutional change is
grounded in an evolutionary model...in which nations proceed from authoritarian forms of government to
democracy.”).
110
See, e.g., Bonnie Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning
Memorandum No. 14, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 2012), http://www.cfr.org/world/armedclash-south-china-sea/p27883 (last visited March 6, 2014); see also Michael Ivanovitch, China and Japan
Trading Goods and War Threats, CNBC.com (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101300548 (last
visited March 1, 2014).
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decisively against them in ways that might have otherwise violated
principles on which the relationship between citizen and state are founded.
This would be similar to the argument recently made by the U.S.
government to support extreme measures, including extra-judicial killing,111
against international opposition.112 The fact that the 1957 Resolution targets
“counter-revolutionists and anti-socialism reactionaries” implies that the
laojiao system emerged as a political device to consolidate the power of the
incipient Chinese government during the tumultuous early years of the
People’s Republic. More importantly, the early political focus of laojiao
was consistent with the class struggle principles inscribed in the 1954 State
Constitution.113
Yet what might be framed as a constitutional necessity—the need to
protect the state against domestic counterrevolutionary insurgents—can also
easily be used to undermine rule of law development. Indeed, the
revolutionary conditions of the 1950s can hardly serve to support extra
constitutional measures more than half a century later when conditions had
changed substantially. To be sure, the problem associated with the laojiao
system is not unique to China. The United States, too, has been criticized
for violating the due-process requirement—most notably for the JapaneseAmerican interment during WWII and the more recent Guantanamo Bay
controversy. 114 Similar to the Japanese internment camp and the
Guantanamo Bay prison, China’s labor camp system was also created in
111

U.S. Justifies Drone Attacks, Says it’s Lawful, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-10-23/us/43323901_1_drone-attacks-civilian-casualtiesobama-administration (last visited March 1, 1014) (quoting White House Press Secretary, Jay Carney, as
saying “[t]he U.S. counterterrorism operations are precise, they are lawful, and they are effective.”); see
also Owen Bowcott, The Legal Dilemma Over Drone Strikes: Justified Killings or War Crimes?, THE
GUARDIAN (UK) (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/drone-strikes-thornylegal-questions (last visited March 1, 2014).
112
Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Experts Urge U.S., Yemen, to Explain Erroneous Drone Strikes,
(Dec.
26,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/26/us-yemen-strike-unREUTERS
idUSBRE9BP0EV20131226?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews (last visited March 1, 2014); see
also Peter Magulies, The Fog of War Reform: Change and Structure in the Law of Armed Conflict After
September 11, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1417, 1471-85 (2012).
113
See, e.g., XIANFA art. 10 (1954) (China) (providing that “[t]he policy of the state towards capitalist
industry and commerce is to use, restrict and transform them. . . . The state prohibits capitalists from
engaging in any unlawful activities which injure the public interest, disturb the social-economic order, or
undermine the economic plan of the state.”); id. at art. 19 (providing that “[t]he state deprives feudal
landlords and bureaucrat capitalists of political rights for a specific period of time according to law”).
114
See, e.g., Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1998); David Luban,
The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 51 (Verna V. Gehring
ed., 2002); Editorial, Bagram: A Legal Black Hole?, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/26/opinion/la-ed-bagram-20100526 (last visited March 1, 2014);
Editorial, Backward at Bagram, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/06/01/opinion/01tue1.html (last visited March 1, 2014).
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response to unique exigencies that arose during unusual periods. Laojiao,
then, appears to serve as the “civilian” counterpart to shuanggui. Just as
shuanggui was to discipline CCP cadres, 115 laojiao was to discipline
bourgeois elements as a means of establishing the people’s democratic
dictatorship116 now fundamental to Article 1 of the State Constitution. This
was possible only by basing the protections of citizenship on designations of
membership in specific economic classes, which was itself implied within
the 1954 State Constitution with its emphasis on class struggle. 117 As a
revolutionary party, the CCP-led government in its early years adopted
harsher measures against its political opponents, justified by necessity and
the revolutionary character of the socialist state building project.118 Yet the
comparisons to the now discredited necessity-based actions of the United
States and Japan should be telling,119 and one that if accepted would suggest
the illegitimacy of laojiao within globally accepted parameters of
constitutional principles already embraced in China.
Thus, a traditional Western style of constitutional analysis produces a
strong case against the legitimacy of laojiao under the State Constitution.
But that analysis is not entirely true to the analytical framework that reflects
the separation of power and constitutional structures of China. As suggested
above, under principles of Chinese constitutionalism, the constitutional
analysis does not end at the text of the State Constitution—it is also
necessary to determine whether laojiao is illegitimate as inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of political leadership expressed through the
CCP. That determination requires an analysis of the conformity of laojiao to
the CCP line with constitutional dimension. As a consequence, the only
possible way to defend the constitutionality of laojiao is to show that it is a
proper expression of political will that can be harmonized with the
governance principles to which the CCP adheres.
A review of Chinese constitutional principles leads to the strong
conclusion that laojiao seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is
currently articulated, and on that basis alone it must either be abolished or
reformed. The key to reform under the CCP constitutional line would be to
115

See infra Part III.
Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary
of the Communist Party of China (June 30, 1949), in SELECTED WORKS, VOL. 5 411-23, available at
http://www.fordham.edu /halsall/mod/1949mao.html.
117
XIANFA art. 1, 10, 19 (1954) (China); see generally Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23.
118
Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23.
119
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1811 (2010).
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incorporate laojiao within the Penal Code through invocation of NPC
legislative processes and administration by the procurate and courts. To
rephrase this in the style of Western constitutional discourse, it is important
to note that even if laojiao appears to conform to the letter of the State
Constitution, it may violate the fundamental constitutional principles on
which the state is organized, as these are elaborated by the CCP in
accordance with its role within the Chinese constitutional system.120 On that
basis, laojiao is an unconstitutional assertion of state power. For this
purpose, the analysis turns from the State Constitution and law to the
constitutionally significant principles of governance developed by the CCP
in its role as the party in power, under whose leadership the political
parameters of the administrative apparatus of the state is supposed to be
undertaken.121
The analysis necessarily starts with the CCP principle of scientific
development. 122 The constitutional questions about laojiao within the
framework of Chinese socialist constitutionalism itself serves better as a
reminder of the utility of action grounded in the constitutional principle of
scientific development.123 Both the State Constitution and the Constitution
of the CCP have progressed beyond a focus on narrowly defined class
struggle. 124 In comparison with its Western counterparts, the Chinese
constitutional development is only in its nascent stage—it is still
rudimentary and suffers from many shortcomings. It can be said that the
most critical deficiency for the Chinese constitutional system is the
unbridgeable gap between “form” and “reality.” The laojiao system clearly
reflects such deficiency—a conspicuously unconstitutional penal system has
120
The nearest analogy is to an interesting facet of German constitutional jurisprudence that accepts
the premise that constitutional principles embedded within the Basic Law may trump specific provisions
therein. See generally, Gerhard Leibholtz, The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the
“Southwest Case,” 46 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723 (1952).
121
Backer, supra note 12, at 11.
122
XIANFA, general program (1982) (China) (providing that “[i]t is an important guiding principle for
China's economic and social development and a major strategic thought that must be upheld and applied in
developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.”).
123
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, 17TH NAT’L CONG., SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT &
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (2007), CHINA.ORG http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm (last
visited March 1, 2014) (stipulating that “[t]he Scientific Concept of Development means putting people
first and aiming at comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development. To put people first, we should
take people's interests as the starting point and foothold of all of our works, make continuous efforts to
meet various needs of the people and promote an overall development of the people.”).
124
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen ( 中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), preamble
(China) (providing that “[o]wing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will
continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain
conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction.”).
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managed to persist for more than half-a-century in spite of the clear intent of
CCP line articulated through the Party and State Constitution. The success
of the project of Chinese socialist constitutional construction directly affects
the legitimacy of the Chinese government under CCP leadership. 125
Constitutionalism, at its core, is grounded in a precise set of fundamental
principles with constitutional effect.126 Constitutionalism can only function
through the internalization and normalization of its principles into the public
memory. 127 The discipline and internalization of a constitutional ideal is
achieved through a prolonged process of consolidation that involves both
institutional design and increasingly strict compliance with constitutional
principles in administrative practice. 128 The failure of constitutional
development, whether Western or socialist, whether created on the American
or Chinese model, opens the door to delegitimation and the rise of
opposition movements whose object is to replace the existing order.129 It
follows that the rule of law is in fact a rule of norms, and it is impossible to
promote constitutional norms without consistent adherence to both written
and unwritten constitution.130
Laojiao functions as a pervasive administrative penal system that
targets the general public. It bypasses formal judicial and prosecutorial
power in a way that is similar to the disciplinary techniques of shuanggui,
125

The General Program of the CCP Constitution makes this clear. Though socialist modernization
privileges economic development, it remains committed to the Four Cardinal Principles as the basis for
building the state. To that extent, the CCP “leads the people in promoting socialist democracy. It
integrates its leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country . . . builds a socialist country
under the rule of law, consolidates the people's democratic dictatorship, and builds socialist political
civilization.” Id. That requires that it “strengthens state legislation and law enforcement so as to bring all
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which is only applied to CCP members.131 But shuanggui ought to apply
only with respect to the obligations that come from membership in the CCP,
obligations that are beyond the jurisdiction of the State Constitution.
Ordinary citizens, the target of laojiao, do not bear a special relationship to
the State; CCP cadres are in a vastly different position. Indeed, the scientific
development of the Chinese constitutional system from its 1954 to its current
framework suggests that the political disciplining of citizens must now occur
within the State Constitution rather than beyond it. That notion is now a
basic part of the CCP line expressed through the State Constitution itself.132
As the CCP has transitioned from its role as a revolutionary party into a
ruling party that represents the will of the masses, a system that was
designed in the Revolutionary Period and justified as necessary to promote
stability is itself increasingly becoming a major source of instability, and is
criticized as such. 133 As such, laojiao appears to contradict the political
settlement evidenced by the adoption of the 1982 State Constitution itself. A
fundamental principle of Chinese constitutionalism derived therefrom is that
the political leadership of the CCP is effectuated through the government
and that the structures of that implementation are set out in the State
Constitution. The CCP’s political leadership of the masses, then, is
government work. To conform to the State Constitution is a necessary
consequence of conformity to the CCP’s political leadership and the basic
expression of the principle of the people’s democratic dictatorship enshrined
in Article 1 of the State Constitution.
It follows, then, that being an extra-judicial form of discipline directly
against the masses, the laojiao system not only violates constitutional
principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP’s “mass line.” The “mass line”
is a foundational principle for the CCP 134 —it expresses the need for the

See infra Part III; see also Larry C. Backer, Abolishing Laojiao 劳动教养 in China; is Shuanggui
Next?, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 7, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot .com/2013/01/abolishinglaojiao-in-china-is.html (last visited March 1, 2014).
132
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133
See infra Part III; see also Backer, supra note 131.
134
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Chinese political system—that is, it has acquired an aura of “constitutionality.” James R. Townsend,
Chinese Populism and the Legacy of Mao Tse-tung, 17 ASIAN SURVEY, 1011 (1977). Its importance was
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party to stay connected with the general public by both adequately serving
and representing the interest of the masses.135 It forms part of the general
program of the CCP Constitution.136 It is central to the idea of the so-called
Party’s style of work—the integration of theory with practice, the forging of
close links with the masses, and the practice of self-criticism.137 The CCP
maintains its proper role by leading, advising, and pointing the way forward,
and by ensuring that the state organs would adhere to the constitutional
principles, which reflects the Party line for a government that best serves the
people.138 In this respect it is useful to remember Deng Xiaoping’s remarks
made in 1957:
The Party’s leadership position is stipulated in the Constitution.
If the Party wants to exercise good leadership, it should
constantly overcome subjectivism, bureaucratism and
sectarianism, accept supervision and expand democracy within
the Party and the state. If we do not accept supervision or work
to expand democracy within the Party and the state, we shall
surely cut ourselves off from the masses and make big
mistakes.139

that “[m]ass line” refers to a guideline under which CCP officials and members are required to prioritize
the interests of the people and persist in representing them and working on their behalf.”).
135
See COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, 11TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, GUANYU JIANGUO YILAI DANG DE
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Deng Xiaoping. See Deng Xiaoping, Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, Speech at a forum on the
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dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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cadres in Xi’an (Apr. 8, 1957), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING VOL. 1 1957 available at
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The current CCP leadership has confirmed the fundamental obligation to
adhere to the mass line.140 This was noted by Xi Jinping, who recently
wrote that: “[t]o fully utilize the Party’s advantage in connecting with the
masses, the most important is the need to adhere to our party’s basic
principles, thoroughly implement party’s general policies for the masses, so
that all the works of the Party may reflect the will and interest of the
people.” 141 Xi also described the connection between the principle of
scientific development and the mass line: “[w]e shall maintain and develop
the progressiveness and pureness of the party through our work ethic and
style.” 142 Taken together, this suggests the CCP’s understanding that the
mass line itself obligates both state apparatus and CCP to adhere to its basic
principles, including necessarily the State Constitution, to the extent it
applies to the rules for making and enforcing law based systems.
It follows that through the principle of adherence to the mass line, the
CCP is obligated to form a government for the people, which has been
accomplished through the promulgation of a written constitution. The
Chinese constitution therefore reflects the official Party Line.143 The CCP is
bound by its own party line—a fundamental tenant of the legitimacy of the
CCP as the party in power. As an extra-judicial form of administrative
discipline directly against the masses, the laojiao system not only violates
constitutional principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP’s mass line. The
continuing presence of the reeducation through labor system poses a major
roadblock to the development of a CCP-led harmonious socialist society
under the guidance of rule of law. What may be seen from the analysis is a
system designed in the Revolutionary Period to promote stability
increasingly becoming a major source of instability as China continues to
develop under CCP leadership. The CCP’s scientific development principle
itself suggests that when an administrative discipline system becomes a relic
from the past, it is time for it to go.
Because Laojiao can be understood as the civilian equivalent of the
shuanggui (Party discipline) system, it is possible that these moves may
portend at least some revisions to the current form or operation of the
140
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shuanggui system, and perhaps even its abolition. What it will replace it is
unclear. On the other hand, even though the techniques are similar,
shuanggui serves very different purposes and is targeted to a group of people
with substantial political obligations as members of the Party in
Power. Laojiao, on the other hand, targets the masses, and in that sense
duplicates and to some extent subverts the administrative order created
through the governmental system created through the Chinese Constitution.
It is unnecessary. Shuanggui deals with political, rather than administrative,
breaches that touch on the disciplinary functions of the Party. It is in this
sense beyond the competence of the administrative authorities represented
by the government apparatus. This constitutional framework may demand
some refinement in the shuanggui system, but not necessarily its
elimination.
III.

SHUANGGUI: SYSTEM IN CONTEXT AND THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY

One of the more interesting issues of Chinese state institutional
organization is the relationship between the Communist Party and the
state. The previous section suggests that although the CCP does not enjoy
an extra-constitutional role in Chinese political organization, it does exist
autonomously from the state and its organs.144 Indeed, under the constitution
that established them and defined their powers, state organs are understood
to be required to accept the leadership role of the CCP.145 This is basic to the
understanding of constitutional fidelity of state organs under the Chinese
state constitution.146
The leadership role of the Communist Party within the Chinese
constitutional framework has a number of important effects for the
construction of Chinese constitutionalism. Many of these roles remain
insufficiently explored.147 Of particular interest is the relationship between
the CCP and the organizing framework of government through the State
Constitution. The nature of the CCP’s autonomy within that structure, or the
extent to which that autonomy is connected at all with the framework
144

See generally, id.
XIANFA preamble, art. 1 (1982) (China). Central to this argument is the notion of people’s
democratic dictatorship ensconced within the Chinese constitutional order in Article 1.
146
Larry C. Backer, A Constitutional Court for China within the Chinese Communist Party: Scientific
Development and the Institutional Role of the CCP, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 593 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1308598.
147
Cf. Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 533 (2007);
see generally, The essays of Tong Zhiwei, in LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, available at
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot. com/2012/02/zhiwei-tong-on-criminal-law-and-justice.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2014).
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developed through the State Constitution, remains an object of study with
substantial importance to an understanding of the division of political and
administrative authority within the State.148
One of the lesser known of these issues grounded in the role of the
CCP within the Chinese constitutional system, particularly because it has
few analogues and therefore little resonance in the West, is the institutional
power of the CCP to discipline its members. CCP discipline is something
quite different from the sort of intra-group discipline of Western political
parties or (outside of Islam perhaps) the disciplining of members within
religious communities.149 Because CCP members wield substantial political
power as members of the political organ that retains the authority to set and
protect the political framework within which the state government operates,
member discipline becomes an intensely political issue. It is bound up in the
primary requirement of the Party to lead by example,150 and it affects the
legitimacy of the institution of the Party to preserve its leadership role within
the Chinese constitutional system. But because CCP members also serve as
officials within the state apparatus, CCP discipline has a significant
connection to the operation of the government. That connection may bring
the institutions of the state and law into play, especially in the context of
disciplinary investigations that are grounded on what are shown to be
violations of national law. But if the process and protections afforded
individuals in state prosecution and CCP discipline are distinct, how are
these two important mechanics of legitimating actions—one focused on the
integrity of the CCP in its leadership role, the other focused on the
government in its administrative role—to be harmonized?
This section starts with a description of shuanggui in its institutional
context. The object is to give the reader a general overview of shuanggui:
148

See generally, Backer, supra note 5.
The literature on political party discipline in the U.S. and Europe is voluminous. See, e.g., Jon X.
Eguia, Voting Blocs, Party Discipline and Party Formation, 73 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR 111-135
(2011); William B. Heller & Carol Mershon, Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting
in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000, 52 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 910 (2008); Joseph M. Colomer,
Policy Making in Divided Government: A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline, 125 PUB. CHOICE
247 (2005); GARY COX & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN (1993); Krehbiel, Keith,
Where’s the Party?, 23 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI. 235 (1993).
150
One example is the report on Xi Jinping’s 2013 speech during a CCP Central Committee meeting.
See Duizhao jiancha zhongyang baxiang guiding luoshi qingkuang taolun yanjiu shenhua gaige zuofeng
jucuo (对照检查中央八项规定落实情况讨论研究深化改进作风举措) [Review and inspect the implementation of the
eight new provisions of the Central Committee and discuss research initiatives to deepen improve the
governance style],
PEOPLE’S DAILY (June 26, 2013), available at http://politics.people.com.cn
/n/2013/0626/c1024-21971250.html; see also Russell Leigh Moses, Xi Jinping’s Rare Scolding of Top
Party Leaders, CHINA REAL TIME (June 26, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/06/26/xijinpings-rare-scolding-of-top-party-leaders/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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what is shuanggui, how it was created, who enforces it, the procedural
framework of shuanggui investigations, and the manner in which cases can
be transferred between different government organs and party discipline
inspection organ. It then turns to the issue of shuanggui and its legitimacy
issue, considering the state of the literature about the practice. The question
of its application, specifically of the failures of local officials to adhere to
the official rules and the implications of that failure, are taken up later.151
A.

The Shuanggui System

What, precisely, is shuanggui? To answer that question it is important
first to distill its operation in theory and as it is elaborated in official
sources. 152 In general, shuanggui is commonly understood to refer to a
specific procedure for cadre discipline under regulations adopted by the
CCP.153 It is commonly seen as a measure that was first used in its current
form in Liang Xiangyin’s embezzlement investigation in 1989.154 At that
time, due to Liang’s position as governor of Hainan province, a special
investigation group was established by the Central Commission of
Discipline Investigation (“CCDI”) and the Ministry of Supervision of the
People’s Republic of China (“MOS”).155 The investigation did not proceed
smoothly because one key witness refused to release any useful information
and her confinement was about to expire.156 It was obvious that in order to
avoid any potential liabilities, the key witness planned to collude with the
suspect to make identical confessions and ruin the investigation. At that
151

See infra Part V.
These official sources represent the distillation of investigations conducted by my research
assistant Gao Shan. To make the analysis more realistic, sources consulted are those routinely available to
the common Chinese citizen. The object is to “see” shuanggui from within the legal-constitutional
perspective of Chinese constitutionalism, rather than from the perspective of a privileged official or an
outside researcher.
153
See Zhongguo gongchandang jilü jiancha jiguan anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli (中国共产党纪律检查
机关案件检查工作条例) [Investigation Regulations for the Discipline Inspection Organ of the Communist
Party of China] (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party
of China, Mar. 25, 1994) [hereinafter Investigation Regulations], translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014). “Shuanggui” can be roughly translated as “double-designated,” which refers to Article 28,
section 3 of the Regulations of CCP on Discipline Regulations that provides CCP disciplinary organs the
right to detain cadres suspected of party rule violations by demanding “relevant individuals appear at a
designated time and place to provide explanations regarding all aspects of the case.” Id. at art. 28.
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Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFORMATION 7, 7-37 (Feb.
19, 2008), (describing the history of detentions of officials in historical context and linking the practice, at
least
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form,
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going
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point, the minister of MOS, Wei Jianxing, instructed the investigation group
to detain the key witness until the necessary information was obtained.157
Later in an internal meeting of MOS, this procedure was
institutionalized as the “designated duration and designated place” rule.158
During the 1990s, the rules of the CCP on disciplinary regulations
incorporated this rule, which began to be understood in the popular mind as
“shuanggui.”159 The term itself is a “contraction of the two ‘specifics’ as
spelled out in the Rules on Investigation.” 160 Shuanggui as a detention
procedure is contrasted with the similar procedures of liangzhi (两 指 ).
Shuanggui only applies to the CCP member. 161 For non-CCP members who
work for governments or state owned enterprises and violate administrative
disciplines, the rule of liangzhi will apply.162 Shuanggui was based on the
CCP’s internal disciplinary regulations.163 Liangzhi is authorized through
the PRC Law on Administrative Supervision and approved by the NPC.164
MOS enforces this rule and the law of administration and supervision.165
Thus, in theory, the rule of shuanggui is more like an internal auditing rule
of a corporation, and liangzhi is a public rule that applies to the whole
society. Although shuanggui and liangzhi are different systems based on
different authorities, in the real world their boundaries are very vague.166
The reason for the ambiguity arises from the fact that in practice,
MOS and CCDI are actually administrated by the same group of people
157

Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.
160
Id. at 11.
161
Id. at 15.
162
Article 20, Section 3 of the Law on Administrative Supervision provides: “[i]n investigating
violations of the rules of administrative discipline, a supervisory organ may adopt the following measures
in light of actual conditions and needs: . . . (3) to order the persons suspected of violating the rules of
administrative discipline to explain and clarify questions relevant to the matters under investigation at a
designated time and place; however, no such persons may be taken into custody or detained in disguised
form.” This “designed time and place” is what people called liangzhi. Thus, for officials who are party
members, they subjected to the rule of Shuanggui; for all officials irrespective of their party membership,
they may subject to the rule of liangzhi. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng jianchafa (中华人民共
和国行政监察法 ) [People’s Republic of China Law on Administrative Supervision] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997) (China).
163
See Backer, supra note 153.
164
See Sapio, supra note 154.
165
Id.
166
Ye Zhusheng, Shuanggui: Between Discipline and the Law, SOUTH REVIEWS (June 10, 2013)
reprinted in Corruption, Shuanggui and Rule of Law, DIU HUA HUM. RTS. J. (June 27, 2013),
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/06/corruption-shuanggui-and-rule-of-law.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014) (noting that “[i]n 1993, the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the Ministry of
Supervision came to operate under one roof, so that in practice it is generally difficult to distinguish
between shuanggui and liangzhi.”).
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under two different titles. 167 Moreover, the institutions also share
administrative and support functions; they share even the same website
portal.168 The merged administration is no accident. On February 17, 1994,
the CCP’s Central Committee and the State of Council agreed to the merger
of MOS and CCDI with a sharing of functions.169 MOS remains an organ of
and under the control of the State of Council, and CCDI remains an organ of
and under the control of the CCP’s Central Committee. 170 Thus, for
example, MOS’s minister at each level served as the deputy secretary of
CCDI. 171 But effectively they operate together as a single unit, though
formally distinct, with the CCDI taking the lead in most cases.172
This connection has grown since 2012. In September 2013, the new
anti-corruption web site was unveiled,173 effectively merging the operations
of CCDI and MOS. The website for CCDI and MOS has included
procedures for popular complaints against official corruption, whether by
Party cadres or officials. There are four ways of reporting or filing a case:
personally visit the headquarters; write letters to report a case; make a phone
call; or report a case on the website.174
Because most of the government officials are also CCP members, this
arrangement might well be considered reasonable and practical.175 But the
result also substantially increased the jurisdictional reach of both organs. As
167

Id.
See, e.g., The Emerging Forms of Chinese Anti-Corruption Institutions, LAW AT THE END OF THE
DAY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-emerging-forms-of-chinese-anti.html
(last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
169
On its website, CCDI has a detailed description on the development of MOS and CCDIC, see
Lishi Yange ( 历 史 沿 革 ) [Historical Background], CCDI.ORG (last updated Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/lsyg/201308/t20130826_9195.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
170
Id.
171
See Zhou Yu, Quanli Zhiyue De Zhongguo Yujing (权力制约的中国语境) [Power Restriction in the
Chinese Context], in JINAN: SHANDONG PEOPLE’S PRESS 151 (2007).
172
See Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166. The article notes that “[i]n 1998, the CCDI and Ministry of
Supervision issued the Notice on Several Questions Regarding the Use of Liangzhi and Shuanggui
Measures by Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs, which stipulated that shuanggui facilities could
neither be set up in offices of judicial organs, places of detention, or facilities for custody and
repatriation . . . nor could dedicated liangzhi or shuanggui facilities be built.” Id.
173
Wang Qishan, Zhongyangjiwei Jianchabu Wangzhan Zhengshi Kaitong Wang Qishan Zhao
Hongzhu Dao Wangzhan Daoyan (中央纪委监察部网站正式开通 王岐山赵洪祝到网站调研) [Wang Qishan and
Zhao Hongzhu Inspect the Newly Opened Webiste of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and
Ministry of Supervision] CNTV (Sept. 2, 2013), http://news.cntv.cn/2013/09/02/ARTI1378088781220166
.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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Larry C. Backer, The Emerging Forms of Chinese Anti-Corruption Institutions, LAW AT THE END
OF THE DAY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-emerging-forms-of-chineseanti.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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a result of the merger, party members are subject to CCDI’s investigation
when they violate either the party or administrative disciplines. 176 Thus,
when one considers shuanggui, one must understand that at times it refers
not merely to the investigation of CCP offenses, but also of violations of
duty imposed on the Party member in his or her administrative role.177
Shuanggui might be viewed as an efficient way against officers’
violation of discipline, especially relating to official corruption.178 But it can
also be viewed as an appropriate means of disciplining individuals with
heightened political authority.179 This is true despite notions that the system
as effectuated may impact its legitimacy under the Chinese constitutional
system.180 Government officers are said to be afraid of shuanggui because
of the application of two of its principal characteristics. First, shuanggui is a
serious investigation that is conducted in a very secret way.181 Second, there
is a sense that the methods of interrogation can be effective and dangerous to
the health and safety of the subjects under investigation.182
CCDI agents are responsible for receiving complaints, filing cases,
conducting investigations, and making punishment decisions.183 Each agent
176

Id.
On the merger of function and jurisdiction, see infra Part V.
Policing the Party, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21561895
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
179
See Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui Investigation Facility, DIU HUA HUM. RTS. J. (July 5, 2011),
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2011/07/official-fear-inside-shuanggui.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014)
(Noting that there are “[t]wo reasons likely contribute to such support. First, shuanggui detainees are
commonly accused of unpopular acts of corruption and graft. Second, shuanggui is almost exclusively used
against Party members, who are part of an elevated socioeconomic group that comprises only 6 percent of
Chinese citizens.”)
180
See Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166. Ye writes that “[t]here are mainly two occasions when this
word comes into public view. The first is when relevant authorities announce that some official is
‘suspected of a serious breach of discipline and undergoing investigation by the [party]
organization.’ . . . . The second is whenever an official under shuanggui dies for whatever reason and the
official’s relatives, scholars, and lawyers raise all sorts of questions, but the public’s attitude ranges
somewhere between “he got what he deserved” to “complete disregard.” Id.
181
Andrew Jacobs, What do the Rukers of China Fear? ‘Shuanggui,’ HERALD TRIBUNE (June 15,
2012), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20120615/ARCHIVES/206151023 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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Referring to a story published in South Review, a magazine based in Guangzhou, China, a
Western reporter wrote: “[l]ittle is known of how investigators go about extracting the confessions which
frequently emerge. Suicides and mysterious deaths while under shuanggui are not uncommon. Former
detainees report being subjected to simulated drowning, beatings, and cigarette burns. In recent months,
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How the Communist Party Weeds Out Its Delinquents, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013),
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delinquents/277116/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (discussing the cases of Yu Qiyi and Jia Jiuxiang).
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functions effectively like a combination of a police officer and a prosecutor.
As the principal organ for the operation of the CCP’s internal anti-corruption
mechanism, CCDI works under the Party Central Committee.184 The local
discipline inspection commission works under the dual leadership of the
CCP committees at the same level and discipline inspection commissions at
the next higher level. 185 The term of office of discipline inspection
commissions is the same as that of the Party committees.186 In practice, the
secretary of CCDI also serves as the member of CCP’s standing committee
at the same level.187
At the CCP’s top level, since the re-establishment of the CCDI, four
out of five secretaries of CCDI have also served as a politburo members of
the CCP.188 The formal location of the CCDI within the CCP organization
structure indicates its importance within the highest level of the CCP
organization. 189 At the provincial level, the organization might look like
this:190
184
For detailed explanation on the structure of CCDIC and Party Committee, see “Lianggui” De
Youlai (“两规”的由来) [The Origin of the “Lianggui”], QIUZHI (求知) [SEEK KNOWLEDGE] 1, 42 (2004),
available at http://www.cqvip.com/QK/81994X/200401/9087094.html; for a detailed chart illustrating the
organization structure, see Organization Chart of the 18th CCP Central Leadership, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE, http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/207121/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
185
See Joseph Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept, 11 CHINA LEADERSHIP
MONITOR
1,
5
(2004),
available
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http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadershipmonitor/article/6226. Joseph Fewsmith believed this arrangement, started since the beginning of Hu’s
presidency designed to improve the authority of CCDI, is, in his opinion, not working well.
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Responsible for research and outreach, explanation of
CDI policy
Educate party members and officials against the violation
of discipline and evils of corruption
Responsibility for the conduct of local CCP meetings and
study groups focused on the discipline system
Incorporated with the branches of MOS and worked
together against misconduct in the workplace.
Investigation of CCP member in state owned enterprises
and other organizations
Records keeping function
Receive the complaints from the public
Human resources functions at the local level for CDI
Charged with the review of investigations and
examinations of those under suspicion
Responsible for the conduct of investigations throughout
the district
In charge of general inspection tasks and responsible for
the election of the district’s special inspector

The place of shuanggui within the Chinese legal system, and the
political and constitutional implications of its character as extra-legal,
provides a base from which one can consider the relationship between law,
legal process, the state, and the Party apparatus, under the umbrella of the
Chinese constitutional system. If, indeed, shuanggui exists outside the law,
then its legitimacy and methods are subject to question within the framework
of the law system developed through the NPC system, which Western and
some internal criticism consider important for the legitimacy of the system.
But is it possible to consider shuanggui as within the legal system,
even if beyond the reach of the legal process and rule systems derived from
actions of the NPC and the state constitution? More precisely, if lawfulness
can derive from sources outside or beyond the State Constitution, might
those serve as a basis for understanding the normative framework within
which shuanggui can exist within the structure of Chinese constitutionalism?
The source of constitutional authority, and its democratic institutionalization,
might be found within the constitution of the CCP itself. Reliance on the
CCP Constitution would also have to rest on the idea that the CCP
Constitution itself forms a part of the constitutional structure of China. If
that is the case, then shuanggui cannot be understood without an
understanding of the construction of Chinese constitutionalism. That is, an
understanding of the relationship between State and Party Constitution in the
formation of the Chinese constitutional system—not grounded in a single
document constituting a state apparatus, but instead based on a dual set of
constituting actions. One action is directed to the formation of the state
apparatus while the other is directed to the constitution of the political
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superstructure of the nation. Within this context, the debate about shuanggui
and its application can take on a substantially distinct character.
B.

Shuanggui and the Legitimacy Issue

The issue of shuanggui raises a number of legal issues that touch on
the relationship between government, CCP, and the organizing
methodologies of sovereign power (through a constitution or otherwise).
The context in which these issues currently arise tends to be corruption
among CCP cadres and the way it may be dealt with legitimately within their
Chinese constitutional order.191 But by its very nature, shuanggui poses a
question about that constitutional order—shuanggui may be necessary, but
its techniques and the authority under which it is implemented appear
nowhere in the instruments that define state power, and only in those that
constrain the powers of the CCP. To what extent does that framework render
shuanggui illegitimate or non-constitutional? Does the fact that shuanggui
exists outside the parameters and constraints of the State Constitution mean
that shuanggui is extra-constitutional and therefor illegitimate, or does it
suggest that the State Constitution does not entirely contain the Chinese
constitutional instruments? This section considers the state of the academic,
and to some extent popular, debate on these issues. It starts with a brief
analysis of the Western approach and then considers the more nuanced
Chinese debates.
1.

Western Theories of Shuanggui Legitimacy

For Westerners, the legitimacy of the mechanics of Party discipline,
like the role of the CCP itself, is difficult to properly understand for lack of
legitimating institutional analogies from which to draw. The actual process
of discipline is not analogous to the process systems that are at the heart of
Western practice. A typical exchange, reflecting the distinct perceptions of
Chinese officials and Western media, is reflected in the contrast between
Western reports of shuanggui investigations and CCP responses to those
191
Since 2004, there have been long discussions about the legitimacy of shuanggui in relation to
Constitutional Order among Chinese academics. Views are varied, but the majority expressed their
concerns on the constitutionality of Shuanggui. See Wang Jingui, “Shuanggui” Yu Zishou: Hefaxing Wenti
Yanjiu (“双规”与自首:合宪性问题研究) [Study on the Constitutionality Problems of “Shuanggui” and
Confession], 8 LEGAL SCIENCE MONTHLY 60, 62 (2005); See also Yu Zhong, Lun ‘Shuanggui” Zai Woguo
Quanli Jiandu Tizhi Zhong De Diwei (论“双规”在我国权力监督体制中的地位) [On “Shuanggui” in the
Power Supervision System in China], 6 J. OF SOCIALIST THEORY GUIDE 19 (2006).
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reports. A Financial Times story from a few years ago well illustrates the
Western approach in the popular press.192 Mitchell writes:
Like so many cadres before him, Mr. Xu disappeared into the
jaws of the Chinese Communist party’s disciplinary inspection
commission. . . . In theory, officials caught up in this extrajudicial twilight zone are merely making themselves available
to party investigators and can be released later without stain. In
reality, the commission’s targets are routinely handed over to
government prosecutors months or even years later, all but giftwrapped for summary show trials and sentencing.193
Mitchell described another shuanggui proceeding in similar terms:
In a more famous example of shuanggui in action, in 2003 the
head of Bank of China’s Hong Kong subsidiary disappeared for
two years before resurfacing in a courtroom in Changchun, a
city in the country’s far north-east. There he was convicted for
a corruption spree that had allegedly begun nine years earlier in
Shanghai. When it comes to “renditioning” suspects from one
jurisdiction to another, the disciplinary inspection commission
appears to be as accomplished as the CIA.194
The CCP refused to make any substantive comment other than a
confirmation that the shuanggui system was invoked, a typical response to
media stories about shuanggui,. 195
On the one hand, there is a suspicion of arbitrariness and abuse
through the application of a procedure that usurps the role of the State and
the application of law in the prosecution of criminal offenses, by labeling
them offenses against Party discipline. 196 On the other hand, there is a
suspicion of political criticism directed at the leadership role of the CCP
192
Tom Mitchell, The Case of the Chinese Mayor who Wasn’t There, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 12,
2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/220818fa-8765-11de-9280-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qyQktiMl. (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. For a typical official response to media inquiries about shuanggui, see Xiao Qiang, CCP
Official Explains “Double Designations,” PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2006),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/26/eng20060926_306561.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). The
CCP official discussed simply responded that shuanggui “means Party members are requested to attend
questioning sessions at a designated place and for a designated duration.”
196
Policing the Party, supra note 178.
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directed to its internal and process driven methods of internal Party
discipline, which is separate from the criminal prosecution role of the state.
At the heart of these differing perceptions is the problem of
corruption. 197 Corruption can be understood as both a political and a
criminal act. The difficulty for the West is the inability to separate the
political from the criminal element inherent in corruption.198 This is inherent
in Western constitutional separation of powers notions in which political and
governmental power are also conflated within a state apparatus. But where
political and administrative power is separated, as it is formally developed in
China, it is possible to view corruption by individuals with political
authority (within the CCP) as distinct from the financial corruption of abuse
of office within the administrative apparatus of the state. Consequently, it is
difficult for Westerners to comprehend a disciplinary organization that treats
the political (breaches of CCP discipline and threat to the political order and
its aspirations) and criminal elements (perversion of administrative system
for personal gain) of corruption through distinct institutional organs. It
sometimes follows that the West tends to applaud Chinese anti-corruption
efforts, 199 but to criticize those efforts that are not undertaken through an
institutional model, grounded in criminal regulation, which is central to
Western notions of appropriate divisions of functions in the organization of
government and the assertion of political power.200
That difficulty explains the contradiction in Western popular press
coverage of shuanggui. The contradiction is made more difficult because of
the popular support in China for anti-corruption efforts in any form.201 The
illegitimacy issue, then, arises from a Western unwillingness to concede the
197
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(Feb.
25,
2011),
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dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022500889.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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In effect, by defining corruption as the use of public power for private gain, modern approaches to
corruption tends to conflate both political action and criminality. Thus for example, the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption “introduces a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules that all
countries can apply in order to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption. It calls for
preventive measures and the criminalization of the most prevalent forms of corruption in both public and
private sectors.” Kofi A. Annan, Forward in United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res.
55/61, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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See, e.g., Celia Hatton, How Real is China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4,
2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23945616 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
200
Sometimes the issue is posed as a cultural one. See Lilja Zhang, Op-Ed., Author: In China,
‘Everyone is Guilty of Corruption,’ CNN (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/23/opinion/chinacorrution-lijia-zhang/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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possibility of the division of power between an administrative structure and
a political structure, each operated under its own system, but bound together
by a common ideological framework.202 Thus, while the Western press tends
to find the methodologies of shuanggui unsettling, at the same time, the
Western press appears to favor stories that confirm the vigor of CCP
responses to corruption and its extirpation.203
The Western press pays less attention to the processes or systems used
to effectuate these anti-corruption campaigns unless it touches on other,
politically sensitive matters, usually centered on the legitimacy of the
Chinese State-Party system.204 For example, the Washington Post reported
the following:
“The big obstacle, I think, is corruption. Because there still is a
very strong sense that corrupt officials must die among the
Chinese population at large,” said Joshua Rosenzweig, research
manager for the U.S.-based human rights group Dui Hua
Foundation. “The revulsion for that offense is so strong that
there would be a potential political cost to eliminating the death
penalty for corruption.”205
Shuanggui, then, brings into stark focus the connection between Party
discipline, criminality, corruption and the legitimacy of the organization of
the state.
For all the interest of the institution of shuanggui in the Western
popular media, there are few studies of the practice in the West. Among the
best was a piece published by Flora Sapio first as an article206 and then in a
monograph.207 Professor Sapio ultimately argues that:
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CNN (June 25, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/china.corruption/index.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting the 2011 CCP anti-corruption campaign largely in a positive light).
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Gillian Wong, China Drops Death Penalty for some Economic Crimes, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022500889.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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See Sapio, supra note 154. Professor Sapio cites only two studies of the practice undertaken in the
West. Id. at 26, n.3. See Graham Young, Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions since the
11th Congress,” 97 THE CHINA Q. 24 (1984); Chang I-Huai, An Analysis of the CCP’s Role in Mainland
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Shuanggui is nothing new: it is just solitary confinement under
a different name. Therefore it could be labeled as a
“neotraditional” practice the regime is unable to suppress.
Coupled with other factors, shuanggui could eventually cause
the regime to collapse. . . . The standardization of Party norms
on detention has not changed the nature of shuanggui, which
remains a form of extralegal detention and should therefore be
abolished.208
She remains critical, suggesting that shuanggui detainees do not enjoy any
of the protections offered defendants under the State Constitution and may
therefore be more vulnerable to human rights abuses.209
Sapio has argued that the Chinese Party apparatus itself has taken the
position that shuanggui exists outside the law and requires justification
through an appeal to exceptional circumstances. 210 This position mirrors
those of Chinese scholars who have argued for the legitimacy of shuanggui
by necessity. 211 Furthermore, Sapio notes that:
The CCDI has openly stated that shuanggui is an extra legal
measure. The official position on this measure has never denied
the existence of serious legislative conflicts between regulations
on shuanggui and the Constitution of the CCP, the Constitution
of the PRC, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Law on
Legislation.212
Citing Professor Han and Professor Tang, Professor Sapio characterizes the
principal argument justifying shuanggui as relating “to the presence of
extraordinary circumstances, as officials’ power to obstruct investigation, the
launch of anti-corruption campaigns, and the difficulty that complex forms
of corruption pose to investigations.”213 As a consequence, there appears to
be a space beyond law within which certain activities of state and Party
organs may function.214
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Prominent Western scholars of China also have noted the potential
tensions in a system in which the Communist Party invokes a rule system
not derived specifically from or managed through the laws enacted under the
umbrella of the State Constitution and its NPC legislative structure:
Shuanggui poses a challenge to our understanding of the
Chinese legal system. It is frankly admitted by just about
everyone involved to be unlawful—in the Chinese system, all
forms of detention must be authorized by law passed by the
National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, and
shuanggui has no such authorization. Yet it is open—the
existence of the system itself is not a state secret—and
pervasive. Thus, it cannot be dismissed as a mere aberration; a
proper understanding of the system has to account for
shuanggui as a constitutive element, not a mistake.215
These criticisms should not be dismissed, but rather, as attempted below,
they may be reframed and thus better understood within the Chinese
constitutional context. From that context, arguments for reform of the sort
noted by these scholars might be strengthened.
2.

Chinese Theories of Shuanggui Legitimacy

Within China, there is “[o]pposition and struggle between ideas.”216
This arises because shuanggui has been viewed as an important method of
disciplining corruption, but there is also substantial criticism when the
method itself appears arbitrary or excessive. 217 Chinese scholarship on
shuanggui might be usefully grouped into three categories. The first include
those who defend shuanggui on acquiescence and utilitarian theories. The
second include those scholars who might be understood as shuanggui
reformers. The last include scholars who consider the constitutional
dimensions of shuanggui directly. Each is discussed briefly in turn.
215

Donald Clarke, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, CHINA LAW PROF. BLOG (Mar. 1,
2008), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2008/03/shuanggui-and-e.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014).
216
MAO ZEDONG, ON CONTRADICTION (1937), reprinted in SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WORKS
OF MAO TSETUNG 85, 93 (1971) (explaining that “[o]pposition and struggle between ideas of different
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classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradiction in the Party and no
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See, Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166 (noting that shuanggui can be deployed not only an anticorruption weapon, but also as a tool for political infighting).
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The majority of the scholarly work considered below takes a neutral
approach, which has produced a number of distinctive analytical approaches.
Most concede the efficacy of shuanggui and avoid constitutional issues,
suggesting a constitutional approach similar to the Western notion of
legitimacy through acquiescence.218 Among these variations, an important
line of thought suggests that shuanggui is a special measure necessitated
under the current realities of the Chinese political situation. These scholars
look to the effectiveness of the process or its utility. The justification of
shuanggui is grounded on a variety of functional grounds, for example,
history, the characteristics of the CCP, the less developed state of the legal
system, and the reality of corruption.
The historical justification of shuanggui is, at its base, comparative in
nature.219 This combines elements of constitutional necessity and appeals to
the sui generis nature of the Chinese constitutional project.220 Some scholars
analyze the history background of the CCP’s birth and make a comparison
between China, Russia, and Western countries.221 They start with the insight
that the CCP is not organized like Western political parties. As a
revolutionary party, both the powers and functions of the CCP must be
understood as different from those of Western political parties. In Western
countries, the political party’s main activity is election. As a revolutionary
party, the CCP faces a different struggle that justifies harsher measures,
especially against internal opponents. Those harsher measures have been
institutionalized as shuanggui as the CCP evolved from revolutionary to
administrative roles.222
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The role of acquiescence and tradition in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is venerable. See Larry
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Interpretation; A Special Case?), LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 24, 2013),
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2014) (discussing McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
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Yang Tao, “Shuanggui” Bianqian De Sikao (“双规”变迁的思考)[Examining the Transformation
of “Shuanggui”], 6 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 15, 15-17 (2006), available at http://www.cqvip.com/QK/
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Administration Party, Yang Tao states that “considering the history background of China at the time when
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Another school accepts shuanggui as a temporary aberration. 223 It
suggests that as time goes by, as a result of the development of the society
and the CCP itself, shuanggui may be optimized or even replaced in the
future. The “special measures” justification is also grounded in a
comparative approach. Its advocates argue that unlike Western political
parties, which are only in charge of the government operations, the CCP has
an absolute power over the whole of society and the nation.224 Using harsh
internal discipline is necessary in maintaining the party’s polices and
limiting the abuse of power.225 Other scholars in this camp argue that due to
the special arrangement of power allocation in China, the CCP needs to
assert a crude process of internal discipline.226 Moreover, China’s current
special political arrangement determines the fact that the prosecution only
amount to a small portion of the accountability of the state power. In most
cases, enforcement is achieved through other measurements, such as
shuanggui.227
A group of Chinese scholars justify shuanggui on the basis of the lessdeveloped state of the Chinese legal system and tend to argue that the lack of
appropriate legislation and the less developed state of the legal system
render special measures like shuanggui both popular and necessary.228 Zhu
Weijiu, consultant of the State Council, nicely illustrates this perspective.229
She suggests:
In countries where the legal system is less developed, the
supervision of the state power is normally informal. The legal
223
Liu Heng, Discussion on the Justification of Shuanggui on the Reality Ground, 5 ACAD. J. OF
SHANXI PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE PARTY SCH. OF C.P.C 33, 33-34 (2006).
224
Id.; cf. XIANFA preamble (1982) (China) (stating that “[t]he system of multi-party cooperation and
political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China for a long time
to come”).
225
Liu Heng, supra note 223.
226
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the government structure. However, unlike the western party, CCP’s non-core members possess enormous
power after CCP assumed a leadership role in governing China. Because such power projects absolute
influence on the government’s administration, CCP needs stronger internal discipline to regulate party
member in the current government structure.”).
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liability is always replaced by other liabilities. Such as in
China, the CCP’s discipline fills in the vacancy of the
insufficient public law regulations.230
They point out that during the social transformation from command
economy to market economy, the society was in lack of law, and the judicial
department was in lack of technique or experience to defeat corruption.231
Under such reality, CCP authorities needed access to measures like
shuanggui.232
Lastly, some scholars elaborate variations of a “transformation
theory,” combining elements of arguments from the other justificatory
schools. 233 The arguments are also grounded on the basic premise that
shuanggui is a special measure. Scholars who advance the “transformation
theory” parallel the arguments of constitutional necessity made in defense of
laojiao. First, they argue that shuanggui was a reasonable reaction to harsh
historical and institutional realities.234 They also argue that regardless of its
constitutionality, shuanggui has proven to be an efficient special measure for
a society still undergoing a process of social transformation.235 During this
reformatory period, Yang posits, the State Constitution is under the process
of reform itself. Thus, it is reasonable and acceptable to have some
conscious flaws in the regulations that violate the Constitution until the
process of reform is completed.236
Arguments from history and necessity also point to the temporary
nature of shuanggui and the likelihood of its reform to better conform the
theory of Chinese constitutionalism with the applied realities of the practice.
For these Chinese scholars, shuanggui will be optimized and follow the rule
of law or even be replaced by an alternative legal regime. This replacement
theory takes one of three forms.
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The first of these emphasizes the “work in progress” aspect of
shuanggui. 237 Some scholars analyze the reason why shuanggui will be
optimized in the future.238 They point out modern political theory suggests
that the government has to win the support of the people by democracy and
rule of law.239 Although CCP developed from a violent revolution, it cannot
follow its old routine forever. Thus, as an administration party, CCP shall
emphasize the cooperation of the different classes of society, especially the
importance of democracy and cooperation. The CCDI’s issuance of detailed
regulations240 on the time and procedural issues relating to the conduct of
shuanggui investigations is the best evidence to suggest that the CCP is
attempting to reform shuanggui so that it follows a rule of law framework,
even if the law followed is that of the organization of the CCP.241 Such
opinion is not isolated because most of CCP’s official publications had
emphasized the importance of internal party democracy and ethical
education in maintaining CCP’s policies and its discipline.242
The second looks to developing parallel administrative structures for
shuanggui outside the government.243 One article in the CCP Party School’s
journal suggests that the CCP will reform its shuanggui process to
harmonize more explicitly with parallel proceedings authorized for criminal
matters under NPC legislation.244 In effect, one might view this as a means
of recasting shuanggui as the political process that might run parallel to the
administrative process against suspects who are also Party cadres.
The third argues that shuanggui should eventually be replaced by a
judicially administered system.245 Some scholars, for example, argue that
Shuanggui ought to eventually be replaced with judicial measures. Zhou
237
See, e.g., Cai Xia, The Maintaining of CCP’s Constitution, STUDY TIMES (Aug. 2009),
http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2006-08/09/content_7066378.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Cent. Comm’n for Discipline Inspection of the
Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), arts. 7 and 28, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014).
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Constitution], STUDY TIMES (Aug. 2006), http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2006-08/09/content
_7066378.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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Yezhong has developed a theory of shuanggui “transformation from
discipline leading to law.” 246 These approaches may also provide for a
remedial mechanism that also incorporates this last position, providing a
basis for the establishment of a reviewing office inside CCP.247
While most articles concede the efficiency of shuanggui and avoid the
constitutional issue, groups of scholars confront the constitutional issue
directly. The first line of scholarly argument asserts that shuanggui violates
the Chinese Constitution. 248 The violation arguments are grounded in a
sense of the deficiencies of shuanggui to follow or apply the procedural
protections afforded through the Chinese Constitution. 249 One critique
suggests that shuanggui directly violates the State Constitution, and in
particular, the provisions of equal protection, personal freedom, and due
process.250 The constitutional argument starts with the normative effect of
the State Constitution’s Preamble, which states that the State Constitution
provides the basic norm of conduct.251 Thus, theoretically, the CCP and its
internal discipline ought to comply with the Constitution. However, in
practice, shuanggui investigations violate Articles 33 252 and 37 253 of the
Constitution. During Shuanggui investigations, investigators may violate
due process and personal freedom by confining the suspect in the premises
for inquiries.254 Such inquiries may constitute an illegal detention without
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the participation of judicial departments.255 Moreover it has been suggested
that shuanggui is used as a tool for plea bargaining—especially to avoid
prosecutions under law. 256 For example, the Commission of Discipline
Investigation (“CDI”) or CCDI may use shuanggui as a plea bargain in order
to get cooperation from the suspects. This practice, it has been argued,
violates the constitutional equal protection rule, which requires that “all
citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”257
A second line of constitutional critique posits that shuanggui created
an extrajudicial procedure, which has harmed the judicial and political
system, and created a zone of illegitimacy that ultimately harms the state.258
The illegitimacy argument is also grounded on the idea that shuanggui
operates within an extrajudicial zone whose existence harms the judicial and
political systems. 259 Shuanggui cannot replace the investigation of law
enforcement departments. It would follow under this critique that to keep
this special measure creates a mechanism for the assertion of power without
constraint, and that, constructed as a power system beyond or outside law,
may ultimately reduce protections to the suspect and damage the legal
system. The constitutional critique is unusually strongly worded.260
But there are also scholars who take the opposite view about the
constitutionality of shuanggui, especially in its relation to Articles 33 and 37
of the State Constitution. One of the more interesting critiques is that of Liu
Zhigang who responds directly to the arguments made by Wang Jingui.261
Liu provides three reasons to explain why shuanggui does not violate the
Constitution. First, Liu argues that shuanggui applies to the relationship
between the CCP and each member. 262 This relationship is a “special
relationship” that is not covered by the Constitution. Second, denying the
application of shuanggui is ideologically illegitimate, an expression of
romanticism and radical-left thinking that disregards the reality of Chinese
255
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of shuanggui will affect the reform of nation’s politic system and legal system.” Id.
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society.263 Third, Liu suggests that “[i]nsisting on the leadership of CCP” is
a basic principle of the State Constitution. 264 Without the CCP’s strong
leadership, there is no basis for the protection of people’s right. Thus, even
though shuanggui may violate someone’s rights, in order to protect the
interest of maintaining the CCP’s leadership, shuanggui might be entitled to
special treatment. He adopts an interest analysis in which he concludes that
the interest of maintaining a strong CCP leadership role is more important
than the niceties of constitutional provisions ostensibly protecting individual
rights.265
Another scholar seeks to transpose Western constitutional notions of
special measures in defense of the extra constitutional legitimacy of
shuanggui.266 Liu justifies his argument that shuanggui will survive as a
constitutional exception by citing the example of Taiwan and Germany to
prove that reserving an exception for special measures is reasonable.267
Taken together, most scholarship suggests discomfort with the
institutional structures and practices of shuanggui. This scholarship
advances the proposition that shuanggui is illegitimate or unconstitutional,
flawed but necessary, a transitional vehicle in post-Revolutionary times, or
that it is exceptional, but still a legitimate expression of power. More
importantly, these approaches agree on the centrality of the Chinese State
Constitution to the analysis of the role of shuanggui, and, through the device
of shuanggui itself, of the role of the CCP in the Chinese constitutional
order.
Relying implicitly on the two fundamental principles of
constitutionalism—1) the identity of the entirety of state power within a
constitution, and 2) the premise that constitutional ideology marks the limits
of constitutional discourse—the standard analyses start from the
presumption of the Chinese State Constitution’s primacy and measure
everything from that base.
The reality of shuanggui suggests something more subtle than
evidence of the willingness of an extra-constitutional institution, the CCP,
implementing extra-legal measures. Liu Zhigang comes closest to arguing
263
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this, but even he ultimately returns to the characterization of shuanggui as a
justifiable exception, and essentially extra-constitutional, measure. 268
Indeed, these explanations, critiques, and defenses are to some extent
unsatisfying precisely because they do not appear to start from a deeper
understanding of the foundational premises of the Chinese constitutional
state. It is to a consideration of shuanggui within what this paper would
argue the appropriate way of understanding the basis of distinctive Chinese
constitutionalism that we turn next.
IV.

THE LEGITIMACY OF SHUANGGUI WITHIN THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

The authority of CCP officials to enact and enforce shuanggui does
not derive from an authority vested in state officials under the State
Constitution. As a consequence, some question shuanggui because it was
neither enacted by action of the NPC nor does it conform to laws enacted
under the State Constitution that apply to government criminal actions and
investigations. It follows that scholars, especially in the West, are inclined
to suggest that the disciplinary processes of shuanggui exist outside the
Chinese constitutional system and that it violates rule of law requirements.269
Some scholars further suggest that the CCP exceeds its constitutional role by
enacting and enforcing shuanggui, and it is to that extent acting
unlawfully. 270 These scholars then argue that CCP and shuanggui must
conform both to the rules of the Constitution and the laws enacted through
the NPC system. The nonconformity to these legal norms leads some to
question the legitimacy of shuanggui,271 and, more broadly, the role of the
CCP in the Chinese constitutional system.272
This line of thinking, and its conclusions about the position of CCP
and shuanggui in relation to the state, arises from an emerging global
consensus about the relationship of states to the legitimacy of their
governmental systems.273 That consensus is grounded on two very simple
principles. The first is one state—one constitution: many people have come
to accept this principle as the basis of all legitimate constitutional theory,
268

Liu Zhigang, supra note 261, at 12.
See supra Part III.
270
See supra Part III.
271
Sapio, supra note 154, at 20-21.
272
See generally Backer, supra note 21.
273
See generally Larry C. Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for
Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671 (2009).
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though it has been questioned by Chinese scholars.274 Many theorists add a
corollary principle, derived in part from ideas made popular by Italian
fascists in the 1930s275 and then reworked for the needs of Marxist Leninist
states in the 1960s: 276 within the constitution, everything; outside the
constitution, nothing. It is possible to posit that much of what now
constitutes the foundations of constitutionalism is grounded on these
principles—the constitution provides all of the basic rules for the
organization of the state and the substantive principles on which its people
are organized. Any action, organization, or principle outside of, or
inconsistent with, the constitutional framework is necessarily illegitimate.
The legitimacy of the construction of government, the limits of distribution
of power to this government, the means by which the government may use
its power, and the persons against whom such authority may be asserted are
all judged from within the organizing framework of these principles.
Most governments have subscribed to these basic rules implicitly.
Virtually all states have developed a written constitution that serves as the
expression of the political will of the people and the highest law of the
land. 277 Those states without written constitutions, including, most
prominently, the United Kingdom, rely instead on a series of important
political settlements, agreements, and juridical principles, which together
constitute the constitution of the nation.278 Most theorists, relying on these
principles and the acquiescence of states in their authority expressed through
consensus discernable by their actions, judge the legitimacy of governments
and the validity of law or policy enforced by such governments by their
relationship to constitutions.
The basic principles of traditional constitutionalist analysis have been
misapplied to the Chinese constitutional context. To that extent, the
274

Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, 12.
See BENITO MUSSOLINI, THE DOCTRINE OF FASCISM (1932), reprinted in THE SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 164-68 (Michael J. Oakshott ed., 1939), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tyr/mussolini.htm (stating “tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla
contro lo Stato,” which translates to “[e]verything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against
the State.”).
276
See Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso Pronunciado como Conclusión de las Reuniones con los
Intelectuales Cubanos, DEPARTMENT OF VERSIONS (June 1961), http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/
1961/esp/f300661e.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (stating “esto significa que dentro de la Revolución,
todo; contra la Revolución, nada,” which translates to “[w]ithin the revolution, everything; against the
revolution, nothing.”).
277
See, e.g., ELKINS ET AL., supra note 7, 36-64.
278
See, e.g., Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta
as Fundamental Law, 51 U. TORONTO L. J. 91 (2001); Jo E.K. Murkens, The Quest for Constitutionalism in
UK Public Law Discourse, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2009). For an interesting discussion of the
evolution of this concept in the 21st century, see DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW (2006).
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conclusions about both CCP and shuanggui are erroneous. The conventional
analysis, whether applied by Chinese or Western theorists, ignores the
distinct features of the Chinese constitutional system by mistaking the State
Constitution for the Chinese constitutional system. The State Constitution is
merely a part and not the whole of China’s constitutional system. Put
simply, the Chinese constitutional system is in the aggregate grounded in an
unwritten constitution.279 Like the traditional U.K. system, it “includes all
rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or exercise of the
sovereign power in the state.”280 This unwritten constitution is made up of a
combination of important written documents and a core of unwritten
principles that are noted in the core set of written documents. The
fundamental documents that form the Chinese constitutional system include
the State Constitution and the CCP Constitution. Its principles, inscribed in
the preamble of the State Constitution and the General Program of the CCP
Constitution, include Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng
Xiaoping theory, and the important thought of “Three Represents.”
Together, these instruments can be understood to serve as the whole of the
constitution of the People’s Republic. Separately, each of these fundamental
documents and principles describes an important component part of that
constitution: the State Constitution focusing on the organization of the
administrative apparatus and its direct relationship to the people; the CCP
Constitution serving as the umbrella through which the political apparatus of
the nation is organized through the institution of the Communist Party; and
the political principles serving to define the substantive framework within
which the CCP and the administrative apparatus of state must undertake
their respective roles.281
Understood in this way, both the CCP and the system of discipline
under the system of shuanggui take on a substantially different character.
The focus of analysis moves from issues of legitimacy grounded in the
extra-constitutional character of shuanggui and of the CCP itself, to a focus
on the conformity of both to their respective obligations and the norms on
which the Chinese constitutional system is based. Shuanggui, in effect, is
extra-constitutional precisely because shuanggui falls outside the
279

See generally Jiang Shigong, supra note 4.
ALBERT VENN DICEY, OUTLINE OF SUBJECT: THE TRUE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15
(1915) (noting that constitutional systems “. . . include[] (among other things) all rules which define the
members of the sovereign power, all rules which regulate the relation of such members to each other, or
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competence of the Constitution, whose role is to administration of the state
apparatus and the relationship of that apparatus to the people. Instead,
shuanggui falls within the legitimate competence of the CCP to be
administered under its line, which necessarily includes the principles
through which the State Constitution was structured.
If the issue of legitimacy becomes irrelevant, then the analysis shifts
to the conformity of shuanggui to the constitutional principles that frame the
organization and operation of the CCP. The discussion of both, then, like the
discussion of the governmental system and its disciplinary mechanisms in
other constitutional states, can be analyzed for conformity to the organizing
principles enshrined in its constitution and the effectiveness of its
implementation. This is the natural result of the application of both Deng
Xiaoping and Western constitutional theory.
To understand the connection between shuanggui, the State
Constitution, and the Chinese constitutional system, it might be useful to go
back to the first principles. The object of this exposition is not to engage in
pedantic historicism, but rather to extract and apply its principles, principles
that still strongly influence the character of Chinese constitutionalism and
the framework structures of Chinese separation of powers doctrine. It is also
to suggest that a generation of scholarship that ignores this fundamental
understanding of the structural framework of Chinese constitutionalism may
not understand correctly the character of the constitutional framework that
prevails in China.
A useful place to start is Deng Xiaoping’s 1980 speech “On the
Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” 282 discussed and
endorsed by the Politburo on August 31, 1980. The speech is ostensibly
about changes in the leadership of the State Council. But Deng uses the
issue of State Council membership to raise a number of important issues that
demonstrates a conception of the relationship of State and Party, and of the
role of the State Constitution within the constellation of higher principles,
which together describe the approach to the construction of Chinese StateParty constitutional system in its modern form. Deng describes four
principal issues with the pre-1980 constitutional organization of State and
Party apparatus: 1) over-concentration of power hindering the practice of
socialist democracy by state organs and the CCP’s democratic centralism; 2)
bureaucratism and formalism evidenced by the practice of permitting cadres
282
Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership, Speech Before the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Aug. 18, 1980), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1460.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
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to hold too many positions or acquire too many deputies;283 3) the failure to
adequately distinguish between the responsibilities of the CCP and those of
the government apparatus;284 and 4) a failure to institutionalize leadership
succession within the Party, requiring a greater willingness of older cadres to
cede front line positions to younger members and for younger members to
accept guidance and leadership from older cadres.285
In order to achieve the core objectives of a socialist state, Deng felt it
was critical to separate the administrative functions of the state from the
leadership functions of the CCP.286 That separation, in turn, was not meant
to create a hierarchical relationship between State and Party, with the State
Constitution in a privileged position as against the CCP. Rather, the object
was to apply a principle of separation of functions which in the aggregate
would define the Chinese constitutional system. That becomes clear in
Deng’s vision for changes both in the State Constitution and in the
development of the Commission for Discipline Inspection.287 With respect
to the Constitution, Deng focused on the relationship between the
administrative function of the State, the construction of government, and the
283
Id. Deng described the complex character of bureaucratism: “[b]ureaucracy remains a major and
widespread problem in the political life of our Party and state. Its harmful manifestations include the
following: standing high above the masses; abusing power; divorcing oneself from reality and the masses;
spending a lot of time and effort to put up an impressive front; indulging in empty talk; sticking to a rigid
way of thinking; being hidebound by convention; overstaffing administrative organs; being dilatory,
inefficient and irresponsible; failing to keep one's word; circulating documents endlessly without solving
problems; shifting responsibility to others; and even assuming the airs of a mandarin, reprimanding other
people at every turn, vindictively attacking others, suppressing democracy, deceiving superiors and
subordinates, being arbitrary and despotic, practicing favoritism, offering bribes, participating in corrupt
practices in violation of the law, and so on. Such things have reached intolerable dimensions both in our
domestic affairs and in our contacts with other countries.” Id.
284
Id. Deng justified distinguishing government and party responsibilities by stressing that “[t]hose
principal leading comrades of the Central Committee who are to be relieved of their concurrent government
posts can concentrate their energies on our Party work, on matters concerning the Party's line, guiding
principles and policies. This will help strengthen and improve the unified leadership of the Central
Committee, facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at the various levels of government
from top to bottom, and promote a better exercise of government functions and powers.” Id.
285
Id. Deng noted “[i]t is of great strategic importance for us to ensure the continuity and stability of
the correct leadership of our Party and state by having younger comrades take the ‘front-line’ posts while
the older comrades give them the necessary advice and support.” Id.
286
Id. Deng noted “[i]n the political sphere, to practice people's democracy to the full, ensuring that
through various effective forms, all the people truly enjoy the right to manage state affairs and particularly
state organs at the grass-roots level and to run enterprises and institutions, and that they truly enjoy all the
other rights of citizens; to perfect the revolutionary legal system; to handle contradictions among the people
correctly; to crack down on all hostile forces and criminal activities; and to arouse the enthusiasm of the
people and consolidate and develop a political situation marked by stability, unity and liveliness.” Id.
287
Id. at part V. Deng explained that “the Central Committee has already set up its Commission for
Discipline Inspection, and is now considering the establishment of an advisory commission . . . Together
with the Central Committee itself, these commissions are to be elected by the National Congress of the
Party, and their respective functions and powers are to be specified.” Id.
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role of the people in these institutions. 288 Popular participation was
understood to be focused on the state organs and organized through the
provisions of the State Constitution. 289 The state organs, in turn, were
understood as defining the administrative sector, but not the totality of the
constitutional system.290
That division between administrative and political organs was made
clear by Deng’s emphasis on the fundamentally distinctive character of
separation of powers under principles of Chinese constitutionalism.
Separation of powers, at the fundamental level of Chinese constitutionalism,
was not between the legislative, executive, and judicial power of the state
apparatus, which in turn serves as the repository of all political and
administrative power. Rather, as this essay seeks to demonstrate, the
fundamental separation of powers, on which the Chinese constitutional
system rests, was meant to be between the administrative organs,
represented by the State Council, and the political organs, represented by the
Central Committee. Deng has discussed the relationship between the CCP
and the state apparatus in following terms:
…[A] truly effective work system will be set up for the State
Council and the various levels of local government. From now
on, all matters within the competence of the government will be
discussed and decided upon, and the relevant documents issued,
by the State Council and the local governments concerned. The
Central Committee and local committees of the Party will no
longer issue directives or take decisions on such matters. Of
course, the work of the government will continue to be carried
out under the political leadership of the Party. Strengthening
government work means strengthening the Party’s leadership.291
Thus, Deng does not appear to suggest that the construction of a state
apparatus grounded in the provisions of a State Constitution would come to
define and regulate, through its substantive and organizational provisions,
288
Id. Deng noted “[o]ur Constitution should be made more complete and precise so as to really
ensure the people's right to manage the state organs at all levels as well as the various enterprises and
institutions, to guarantee to our people the full enjoyment of their rights as citizens, to enable the areas
inhabited by minority nationalities to exercise genuine regional autonomy, to improve the system of
people's congresses, and so on. The principle of preventing the over-concentration of power will also be
reflected in the revised Constitution.” Id.
289
Cf. XIANFA art. 2 (1982) (China).
290
Cf. id. at arts. 2, 5, 10 and preamble (the preamble provides that “[t]he system of multi-party
cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China
for a long time to come”).
291
Deng Xiaoping, supra note 282.
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the practices and exercise of leadership by the CCP itself. Nor was it meant
to impose norms on the organization and functioning of the CCP, especially
in its internal workings. Instead, Deng sees “[t]he purpose of reforming the
system of Party and state leadership is precisely to maintain and further
strengthen Party leadership and discipline, and not to weaken or relax
them.”292 For this purpose, Deng assumed the power of the Party over its
own organization and discipline within the logic of the State-Party system—
a matter for the Party rather than for the State, and thus one necessarily
beyond the ambit of the State Constitution.293
Thus, Deng’s theory might appear to be grounded in a distinction
between political and administrative power, which he understood in the form
of the division of authority between State Council—the chief administrative
authority of the state apparatus (its government) 294 —and the Central
Committee, the highest authority within the CCP. Each is understood to be
ordered in accordance with the logic of its own role-function, and both
together must represent the entirety of the exercise of the sovereign power of
the people.
This is made clear, perhaps, in Deng’s famous speech, “Uphold the
Four Cardinal Principles,” delivered in 1979 at a forum on the principles for
the Party’s theoretical work. 295 For the state and its organs, there is the
constitution and law. For the political and its apparatus, there is socialist
democracy which operates within its own governance framework. Both
adhere to the same set of substantive principles from which deviation is not
possible. Within that framework, both the administrative and the political
organs may establish their operational systems. Of principal interest in that
regard are the last three principles—to uphold the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party under the constraining
292
Id. Deng further explains that “[i]n a big country like ours, it is inconceivable that unity . . . could
be achieved among our several hundred million people . . . in the absence of a Party whose members have a
spirit of sacrifice and a high level of political awareness and discipline, a Party that truly represents and
unites the masses of people and exercises unified leadership.” Id.
293
See id. Deng observed that “[t]his work should be performed by Party committees and leading
cadres at all levels, as well as by all other Party members . . . the decisive condition for success is that all
Party members, especially those in leading positions, be the first to do what they expect the masses to do.
Thus, for our ideological and political work to be successful, it is necessary to improve the leadership
provided by the Party and to improve its leadership system.” Id.
294
Deng’s use of the term State Council is now perhaps better understood as a shorthand reference to
the complex of State Council and NPC as the legislative and executive arms of the administrative organs of
the State whose work, and whose relationship with the masses and democratic principles is the object of the
State Constitution.
295
Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137 (describing the four cardinal principles, a foundation of the
modern Chinese state: keep to the socialist road; uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; uphold the
leadership of the Communist Party; and uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought).
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ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong thought.
The first two suggest the distinctive approach to issues of democracy that are
coherent only in the context of a division of competence between
government and Party.296 Indeed, for Deng, it is the connection between the
masses and the CCP, and not between the people and the government, that is
the essence of democratic organization and the direct line for political power
delegation.297 Specifically, the relationship between the CCP and the masses
reflects the way in which the state undertakes its administrative program
under the leadership of the CCP, which is responsible for formulating the
political direction of the state apparatus. 298 The last suggests the
fundamental political constraints on the CCP itself—a CCP that does not
develop and advance communism in China is itself illegitimate.
Deng Xiaoping theory, then, provides a useful starting point for the
construction of Chinese constitutional systems, one that is built into both the
State and CCP Constitutions themselves. It requires the development of the
logic of the Chinese situation within the theoretical framework of the
realities confronting China, but also the avoidance of the petrification of
theory and practice at some fictional “golden age.”299 But it is grounded on

296

Id. Deng justified the dictatorship of the proletariat by stressing that “…we must recognize that in
our socialist society there are still counter-revolutionaries, enemy agents, criminals and other bad elements
of all kinds who undermine socialist public order, as well as new exploiters who engage in corruption,
embezzlement, speculation and profiteering. And we must also recognize that such phenomena cannot be
all eliminated for a long time to come. The struggle against these individuals is different from the struggle
of one class against another, which occurred in the past (these individuals cannot form a cohesive and overt
class). However, it is still a special form of class struggle or a special form of the leftover, under socialist
conditions, of the class struggles of past history.” Id.
297
Id. Deng explained that “[i]n reality, without the Chinese Communist Party, who would organize
the socialist economy, politics, military affairs and culture of China, and who would organize the four
modernizations? In the China of today we can never dispense with leadership by the Party and extol the
spontaneity of the masses. Party leadership, of course, is not infallible, and the problem of how the Party
can maintain close links with the masses and exercise correct and effective leadership is still one that we
must seriously study and try to solve. But this can never be made a pretext for demanding the weakening or
liquidation of the Party's leadership.” Id.
298
Id. On the leadership role of the CCP, Deng explained that “[i]t is quite obvious that under these
circumstances extensive readjustment may be accompanied by small or big disturbances. We can avoid
them only if we have strong, centralized leadership and a strict sense of organization and discipline, only if
we strengthen our efforts to maintain public and political order and to educate people in this regard, and
only if we firmly improve the style of work in the Party and take further steps to restore its fine traditions of
seeking truth from facts, following the mass line and working hard.” Id.
299
Id. Deng warned against ideological fundamentalism, stressing that “[w]e will not, of course,
backtrack from scientific socialism to utopian socialism, nor will we allow Marxism to remain arrested at
the level of the particular theses arrived at as long as a century ago. This is why we have often repeated that
it is necessary to emancipate our minds, that is, to study new situations and solve new problems by
applying the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”). Id.
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the political premises of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 300 and the
leadership of the Communist Party. Those principles make no sense
overlaid on Western notions of separation of powers within a government
into which all political power of the people is vested and for which one
constitution is developed to organize this power.
Applying the insights of Deng Xiaoping theory helps to better
understand the universe of the Chinese constitutional system. China is
governed under a constitution, but that constitution is not the State
Constitution.301 The State Constitution itself points to that conclusion.302 To
reject that position is to ignore the realities of the fundamental basis for the
organization of the State and to subvert the core organizational feature of the
government—a separation of powers between the administrative apparatus
in the State Council-NPC and the political apparatus in the Central
Committee and CCP apparatus. Post-revolutionary China has long rejected
the idea that the State Constitution alone defines the full extent of the power
organization in China, rather than defining the administrative powers of the
state and providing gateways to extra-administrative power, the sources of
which lays with the people.303 In Western states, the whole of the sovereign
power of the people is organized through a single constitution that then
divides this power among three branches of the government that embody
that power and manage its use in accordance with the ruling ideology. In
China, the fundamental division of power is organized differently. It starts
with a division between administrative and political functions, and creates
two sets of organs for their respective administration. Each is governed in
accordance with its own constitution, and both embody only that power only
to the extent permitted under the ruling ideology—Marxist Leninist and Mao
Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, the important theory of the Three
Represents, and scientific development. To treat the State Constitution as
the embodiment of the whole of the Chinese constitutional order, then, is to
transform the Chinese constitutional system into something it is not.
As a consequence, the basis of the legitimacy of the shuanggui system
is not to be found in the State Constitution, but rather in the constitution of
the CCP. The fact that shuanggui is not grounded in the provisions of the
State Constitution, or that it is not subject to the provisions of law required
to implement the administrative obligations of the state toward all of its
300

Now understood more broadly as the peoples’ democratic dictatorship. See XIANFA art. 1 (1982)

(China).
301
302
303

Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 40-43.
See supra Part II, regarding the constitution’s application to Laojiao and the mass line.
See, e.g., XIANFA arts. 1, 17, 27 (1954); cf. Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 12.
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citizens does not affect its constitutional legitimacy. Shuanggui is
necessarily extra-constitutional in the same way that the constitutional role
of the CCP is also beyond the State Constitution’s competence—one limited
to ordering the administrative responsibilities of the government and its
relationships and obligations to all Chinese citizens. But to call it extraconstitutional is to fail to understand the scope of the Chinese constitutional
system itself. In this case, it may fall within the Chinese constitutional
order, but outside the constitutional competence of the government formed
under the State Constitution.
Consequently, the legitimacy of the shuanggui system must be
grounded in meta-constitutional principles applicable especially to the CCP
and its activities. This follows from two core premises of the Chinese
constitutional system. The first is that the State Constitution does not
provide the legal basis for the regulation of Party activities, including its
internal discipline procedures under the shuanggui umbrella. The second is
that the CCP necessarily adheres strictly to its own line, including the
political principles on which the provisions of the State Constitution are
based. But where are these constraining principles to be found? The answer
has already been suggested: those constitutional principles are found in the
superior constitutional principles of Marxist Leninist, Mao Zedong theory,
Deng Xiaoping theory, and the important thought of the Three Represents,
referenced in the State and CCP Constitutions.304 Because those overarching
constitutional principles apply in equal measure to the interpretation of the
State Constitution and its provisions, the result is a tendency to harmonize
the basic operating rules of administrative and CCP detention systems. But
the source of authority for each derives from different sources—
administrative systems through the State Constitution, and Party systems
through the constitutional principles of the political organization of society.
Shuanggui provides a framework for deriving those principles as applied. It
also provides the context for the improvement and development of these
systems in line with constitutional principles. Legitimacy is preserved, and
the “epistemological basis for analysis”—the knowledge base that allows
one to develop an analytical framework in the first place—is uncovered. It
is in this sense, perhaps, that one can understand.

304

See XIANFA preamble (1982) (China); Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程)
[Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14,
2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), general program (China). The latter adds the scientific outlook on
development as an important principle of governance.
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This also suggests the last issue relating to the constitutional
legitimacy of shuanggui—one that touches on the relationship between the
CCP and the State Constitution and that requires the constitutionalization of
the role of the CCP and its separation from State organs. 305 As a
consequence, then, a better way to understand the relationship is based on
connection rather than hierarchy.306 The Constitution has developed under
the leadership of the CCP and reflects the ideology central to the CCP’s
political mission. It is an important expression of the application of ideology
in the articulation of the structures of the administrative apparatus and of the
proper relationship between state officials and the people they serve, so that
both will work toward the ultimate political goals of the nation.
As a consequence, the CCP must follow the principles of the
constitution because it precisely reflects and is the product of the political
work of the Party. But the CCP is not obliged to follow the letter of the State
Constitution itself precisely because it is meant for the regulation of the
administrative and not the political sphere. Theoretically, then, there can be
little space between the Party and the Constitution. The Constitution and the
Party exist in a harmonious and reciprocal relationship rather than in a
vertical one. Likewise, the state and the Party must be understood as
working in a harmonious and reciprocal relationship, each sensitive to the
role of the other. It is in this sense that one can understand Xi Jinping’s
recent reminder that “all must act in conformity with the Constitution and
the laws,” while also noting his remarks to the Politburo in February 2013
that “the rule of law and the rule of virtue must go hand in hand, and the rule
of law must be better observed in social management.” 307 To act in
conformity with the Constitution and the law means that the administrative
organs must act in accordance with the law and within the jurisdictional and
political constraints imposed under the leadership of the CCP through the
State Constitution. But it also means that all individuals must conform their
behavior to the law.
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Cf. Tong Zhiwei, Bujin Yao Kending “Dahei,” Yeyao Fouding “Heida” (不仅要肯定 “打黑,” 也要否

定 “ 黑 打 ”) [We must not only Affirm the “Anti-crime” Campaign, but also deny the use of “Black

Methods”], FALU WEIBO (Apr. 19, 2011), http://libertyzw.fyfz.cn/art/966841.htm, (last visited Mar. 1,
2014), English translation available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/part-ixzhiwei-tongseries-we-must-not.html.
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Backer, supra note 138.
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Xi Jinping Says all must Act in Conformity with Constitution, Laws, XINHUA (Feb. 24, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/24/c_132189143.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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Most importantly, it requires the CCP to adhere to its own line.308 Xi
Jinping has emphasized recently that this means applying the mass line to
the work of the CCP, including shuanggui.309 But it is also expressed in the
principles implemented through the State Constitution as an expression of
the Mass Line. The Constitution begins, “[t]his Constitution affirms the
achievements of the struggles of the Chinese people of all nationalities and
defines the basic system and basic tasks of the state in legal form; it is the
fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority.”310 Note how
the meaning may appear clearer when critical words are stressed. The object
of the Constitution is more modest than its Western counterparts—it means
only to define the system and tasks assigned to the state and then only to the
extent it is to apply in legal form. It has nothing to say about the political
system and the tasks assigned it, except, perhaps through Article 1 and its
reference to the people’s democratic dictatorship, 311 to which form of
political structure the constitution must serve in the legal sphere. The
Constitution likewise reinforces the limited scope of its application, and its
administrative-legal character, by emphasizing its supremacy within the
legal sphere (in the construction of those rules through which to organize
the state and arrange for the fulfillment of the state’s obligations, there
defined, to the people). Within that sphere, the Constitution has supreme
legal authority, though not political authority. Indeed, notwithstanding that
all power in the PRC belongs to the people,312 “[t]he organs through which
the people exercise state power are the NPC and the local people’s
congresses at different levels.”313 To determine the constitutional framework
308

On this point, the CCP Constitution states that “[t]he Communist Party of China takes MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and
the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action. . . . All Party members must cherish the path,
the theories and the socialist system that the Party has explored and created after going through all the
hardships; and they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them. Zhongguo
Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the
Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. PROGRAM (China).
309
Raymond Li, supra note 16 (reporting on a CCP teleconference in Beijing hosted by the senior
party leadership in 2013 “to kick-start a clean-up campaign to reinforce the ‘mass line’ of its 80 million
members . . . Xi, who became party leader seven months ago, said the year-long campaign would be a
‘thorough clean-up’ of undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and
extravagance.”).
310
XIANFA preamble (1982) (China).
311
Id. at art. 1 (stating that “[t]he People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.”).
312
Id. at art. 2.
313
Id. Here the contrast with the language of Article 2 of the 1954 Constitution (stating “the organs
through which the people exercise power are. . .”) is telling. Likewise the 1982 State Constitution provides
only that “[c]itizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or
exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary.” Id. at art. 41.
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for the assignment and constraints on the political authority, the constitution
itself points elsewhere—to the CCP,314 to the ideological framework within
which both political and administrative power must be exercised,315 if it is to
be exercised legitimately, and to the documents that organize that political
authority.316
As such, the leadership of the CCP, as the party in power, is not itself
constrained by the State Constitution. While Party cadres as individuals
must adhere to lawful conduct as specified in the State Constitution, the CCP
as an institution is not limited by the rules imposed on the State through the
State Constitution. The sources of CCP power lie elsewhere within Chinese
constitutionalism. Article 1 of the State Constitution incorporates this notion
by adhering to the framework of people’s democratic dictatorship (State
Constitution Article 1 “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state
under the people’s democratic dictatorship”). The idea is bound up both
with the conception of the constraints on political rights and thus with the
definition of “the people” for purposes of conferring political authority and
participatory rights.317
In a sense, then, the question reminds us that the Three Chinese
Characteristics (三个至上)318 do not exist apart, but must be understood as
three parts of a single insight—the socialist road is created by the application
of socialist ideology through socialist institutions. A careful reading in
The object is confine popular action against state organs but not with respect to political matters which are
expressly extra constitutional in scope and vested in the CCP. Id. at art. 1.
314
Id. at preamble.
315
Id. at preamble, arts. 1, 5 (Article 5 specifically provides that “[t]he state upholds the uniformity
and dignity of the socialist legal system.”).
316
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen ( 中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN.
PROGRAM (China).
317
This was famously expressed by Mao Zedong at the time of the founding of the People’s Republic.
He stated, “[y]ou are dictatorial. My dear sirs, what you say is correct. That is just what we are. All the
experiences of the Chinese people, accumulated in the course of successive decades, tell us to carry out a
people's democratic dictatorship. . . . These two things, democracy for the people and dictatorship for the
reactionaries, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship. Why must things be done in
this way? Everyone is very clear on this point. If things were not done like this, revolution would fail, the
people would suffer and the state would perish.” Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship
(June 30, 1949), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1949mao.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014).
318
Hu Jintao introduced the concept of the Three Chinese characteristics or the Three Supremes (San
ge Zhishang, 三个至) in 2007. The Three Supremes include: “Supremacy of the business of the CCP”
(Dang de shiye zhishang, 党的事业至上); “Supremacy of the interests of the people” (Renmin liyi zhishang 人
民利益至上); “Supremacy of constitutional law” (Xianfa falü zhishang, 宪法法律至上). It was met with a
mixed reaction. CHINA MEDIA PROJECT, THREE SUPREMES, http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/11/12/6603/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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context makes clear that coordination rather than separation are stressed: the
business of the CCP is supreme precisely because it furthers the supremacy
of the interests of the people, which are expressed through the constitution
and laws. To view these as adversarial rather than complementary, then,
seeks to import a Western construct of constitutionalism on a system within
which the mediation of such tensions are not the basis for political
organization.319 The key to the relationship of the State and the Party, then,
should be coordination rather than separation; harmonious society principles
suggest that it is more preferable to make improvements based on the
existing framework rather than drastically altering the entire system.320 So,
the Constitution is the Communist Party line!321 If the State Constitution is
the CCP Line, then adherence to the principles of the State Constitution is
not merely compatible with CCP practices, but an affirmation of the official
expression of the CCP line as translated into the administrative sphere. As
such, all CCP cadres are bound to follow the State Constitution as an integral
part of their Party work. This follows not because the State Constitution
requires it, but because the political authorities do, consistent with the
political foundations of the state. It is in the form of the State Constitution,
that the CCP’s fundamental political policies can be framed for the people
and implemented through the administrative organs.322 It is in this sense that
rule of law with Chinese characteristics becomes evident. The state organs
are subject to the State Constitution and the laws because they have been
bound to this rule under the leadership of the CCP in enacting the State
Constitution. For administrative organs to disregard the law or the
constitution is the same as rejecting the core expression of the CCP line. But
the CCP is bound by constitutional principles precisely because they reflect
the basic thrust of the CCP line it has embraced. In both cases, the State
319

Cf. Jerome A. Cohen, Body Blow for the Judiciary, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 18,
2008), http://www.cfr.org/china/body-blow-judiciary/p17565 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting that
many Chinese judges are “confused and unhappy about this apparent return to the past, to the use of law as
an instrument of ‘proletarian dictatorship’ implemented through the ‘mass line’ in the guise of
‘democratisation.’ How to reconcile the newly propagated ‘mass line’ with legal norms and procedures
must be a particular challenge for SPC vice-presidents and provincial high court chiefs.”). Please note that
Cohen’s report reflects a reading of Chinese constitutional development that singularly focuses on the
events that occurred after the fall of the Gang of Four while severing the rest of the Chinese constitutional
history. Such view is grounded upon the premise that the courts must inexorably move to a position where
they would be the arbiters not just of administrative implementation of constitution and law (which they
ought to be duty bound to do), but that this authority and the State Constitution on which it is based, would
then invert the political relationship between CCP and courts as an instrument of the state apparatus.
320
Backer, supra note 138.
321
Id.; Backer, supra note 12, at 12.
322
Backer, supra note 21.
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Constitution and constitutional principles represent the expression of the will
of the people through the exercise of the people’s democratic dictatorship.
This essential nature of socialist rule of law is sometimes
misunderstood by some who seek to substitute Western notions of the rule of
law, applicable to the facts of their organization, to the Chinese situation.323
In particular, it is important to note that socialist rule of law does not suggest
the inferiority of the CCP or the people to an unbending law system. Nor
does it reject rule of law as a basic normative framework of the
constitutional order. What makes the system socialist is both the focus on
the State’s duty to develop the productive capacity of China 324 and the
separation of powers framework understood as the constitutionalization of
the Four Cardinal Principles.325
The supremacy of the State Constitution and law means that these
collective expressions of norms developed under CCP leadership can never
be inferior to the rule of any person or the arbitrary conduct of any small
group of individuals. The law serves the people by ensuring that rules and
not individual will serves as the basis for the construction of socialist
democracy in China. As Hu Jintao stressed in his 2012 speech before the
Eighteenth Party Congress, “[p]arty organizations at all levels and all Party
members and officials, especially principal leading officials, must willingly
abide by the Party Constitution as well as its organizational principles and
guiding principles for its political activities; and no one is allowed to place
oneself above the Party organization.”326 Of course, in many instances, the
functional result of the application of administrative or political systems will
be quite similar and the operational rules will have to tend to operate
harmoniously. That is a necessary consequence of the constraints of the
substantive framework within which both systems must operate. Yet,
similarity in approach does not mean that the source of their authority is the
same nor does it suggest that one must defer to the other. It is precisely
because, as Yang Xiaoqing argues, the supremacy of the people’s interest
permits the CCP to develop rules for the discipline of its own members in
the discharge of the heavy obligation of CCP leadership, that shuanggui is a
323

Yang Xiaoqing, supra note 15.
Deng Xiaoping, We Review the Past to Open Up a Path to the Future, THE SELECTED WORKS OF
DENG XIAOPING (Sept. 5, 1988), http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-review-the-pastto-open-up-a-new-path-to-the-future/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (observing that “the focus of our work
should be shifted from class struggle to developing the productive forces and modernizing the country”).
This idea is also captured in the notion of socialist modernization in the CCP Constitution general program.
325
Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137.
326
Hu Jintao, supra note 24.
324
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legitimate expression of power.327 As Hu has pointed out, “[w]hen the Party
maintains its strength and close ties with the people, China enjoys prosperity
and stability and the Chinese people live in peace and happiness.”328
It is precisely because the CCP is also bound to follow its own line, to
remain true to the revolutionary principles on which the state was
established in 1949, that principles expressed in the State Constitution must
also be applied as applicable to the particular circumstances of the
shuanggui system. The CCP retains its leadership authority as it remains
true to the principles on which it was founded and scientifically develops
them for the welfare of the people. The Constitution and the Party, the
administrative units of the government and the political organization under
the leadership of the CCP, produce constitutional unity in a way that is
consonant with the political premises under which the Chinese state is
organized.
Yet for all of the elegance of the theory elaborated in this section, it is
necessary to confront an important substantive criticism: the failure to
appear to deal directly with a seeming contradiction within the constitutional
order itself. The core of that contradiction centers on what might be argued
to be the inherent ambiguity of the CCP and State constitutional language.
This is particularly acute where the Chinese State Constitution appears in
places to claim to be governing both administrative and political orders329
and similarly where ambiguous claims of the CCP appear to suggest that it is
simultaneously above or outside the Constitution and also within and
subservient to it.330 It is plausible, though, to argue that the language of the
constitutional documents can lend themselves to diverse interpretation—
aided in part by the rich foundational materials of pre-packaged ideological
327

Liu Zhigang, supra note 261, at 11-14.
Hu Jintao, supra note 24.
See, e.g., XIANFA art. 5 (1982) (China) (stating that “[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law. The People's Republic of China practices ruling the
country in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.”). If the CCP is an
“organization” is it not subject to the State Constitution? See id. art. 28 (stating that “[t]he state maintains
public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter- revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that
endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and
reforms criminals.”). If the State is assigned this task, then does that include overseeing the internal affairs
of the CCP? Lastly, if the CCP is an “organization” for purposes of the State Constitution, then is it subject
to the constraints of Articles 1 and 5, which provide the State with the authority to constrain its unlawful or
subversive activities? We have suggested that a closer reading of these provisions with an emphasis of the
differences between state activities and political activities changes the meaning of these provisions.
330
See, e.g., Xi Jinping Vows "Power Within Cage of Regulations," XINHUA (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/22/c_132120363.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014)
(reporting that “[d]uring a CCP disciplinary watchdog meeting . . . Xi ordered enhanced restraint and
supervision on the use of power, [Xi] said, ‘[p]ower should be restricted by the cage of regulations.’”).
328
329
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approaches ready made for that purpose. Indeed, both Western and
European Soviet perspectives have been applied to stretch the ambiguities of
the extant language of the Chinese Constitution in multiple directions.331
There is ambiguity nonetheless. On the one hand, Article 1 speaks to
the construction of a socialist state under the people’s democratic
dictatorship. On the other, Article 5 declares that no organization or
individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the
law. The 1999 revision to Article 5 added, “[t]he People’s Republic of
China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a
socialist country of law.” If one reads these two provisions as each having
independent legal significance, then it might be possible to suggest that
Article 5 modifies Article 1. If that is accepted then it might suggest that the
CCP is also not above the Constitution in a literal sense (that is that the CCP
in its constitutional role is within rather than beyond the State Constitution).
But a better and more coherent reading of the constitutional provisions
would start by understanding that, with the adoption of a people’s
democratic dictatorship as the basis of the form of constitutional governance
in China, then necessarily, the role of the CCP cannot be understood as
falling within it. The concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship,
central to the understanding of the construction of the Chinese constitutional
order, then, must be read into Article 5 to avoid constitutional incoherence.
Admittedly the people’s democratic dictatorship is under-theorized.
Moreover as a constitutional doctrine, it has become more than a mere
reflection of the initial iteration by Mao Zedung in 1949, which is no longer
sufficient, standing alone, to explain the concept or its constitutional
significance. 332 But at its core, the concept of people’s democratic
dictatorship makes clear that the Constitution serves both as a superstructure
over the state and as an expression of the power of the people expressed
through the CCP, which remains both beyond the specific law of the
constitution, and yet embraces its principles as the concrete expression of its
democratic dictatorship.333 The people’s democratic dictatorship speaks not
to individuals, but to the leadership role of a representative body of the
people themselves—the CCP—of the body politic. That body politic is

331

See generally, Backer supra note 5.
This is a deficiency we expect to help remedy in future work.
333
See Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23 (wherein Mao described people’s democratic
dictatorship as a system “under the leadership of the working class [through the Communist Party] and
based upon the alliance of workers and peasants. This dictatorship must unite as one with the international
revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.”).
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above the Constitution and the law, as articulated in Article 5, but not above
its own principles.
One approach out of that ambiguity is to avoid foreign ideological
error and instead apply a Chinese Marxist approach to the Chinese Marxist
Constitutional order, one that is committed both to its coherence and to a
democratic ideal, the seeds of which are embedded in the current structure of
the Chinese political order. The key to that approach may be in the
Constitutional preamble—the most frequently modified portion of the
Chinese constitution,334 and in the general program of the Constitution of the
CCP. The Constitution of the CCP translates the people’s democratic
dictatorship into more elaborate language:
The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting
socialist democracy. It integrates its leadership, the position of
the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law, takes
the path of political development under socialism with Chinese
characteristics, expands socialist democracy, improves the
socialist legal system, builds a socialist country under the rule
of law, consolidates the people’s democratic dictatorship, and
builds socialist political civilization.335
The Preamble to the State Constitution amplifies this concept. Paragraph 2
of the Constitution sets the template: “[t]he people’s democratic dictatorship
led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants,
which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been consolidated
and developed.”336 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble provides the structures of
the roadmap within which the parameters of the Constitution are drawn:
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the
guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng
Xiaoping theory and the important thought of “Three
Represents,” the Chinese people of all nationalities will
continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and
follow the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions,
develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system
334
See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (1982) for a listing of amendments in 2004, 1999,
1993 and 1988.
335

See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist
Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN.
PROGRAM (China).
336
XIANFA preamble, para. 2 (1982) (China).
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and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry,
agriculture, national defense and science and technology step
by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level
of culture and democracy.337
Here, one can see both the interaction of state and Party Constitution and
their consonance with respect to the place of the CCP as something both
above the law it makes for the administrative organs of the state and the
protection of the people, yet also deeply embedded within constitutional
principle. The CCP must adhere to its own principles and apply them
internally as its own law because to fail to do so betrays the essence of the
people’s democratic dictatorship on which the legitimacy of both state and
Party are grounded.338 Indeed, the CCP Constitution itself makes clear that
“The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the
Constitution and laws of the country.”339 But within the framework does not
mean subject to. Rather, it relates to the means by which Party leadership is
undertaken, under rule and principle rather than under the will of
individuals.
Still, what may strike some critics as a particularly strong weakness is
that the expression of the actual constitutional order presented here cannot
be readily extracted from the original sources. The article is unable to point
to any single statement in any single document that clearly and
authoritatively says what is suggested here—that is, no PRC document or
leader has ever directly and simply said: administrative power is vested in
the government and political power is vested in the CCP. Therefore, it might
be argued that if our insights have any relation to reality then surely the State
Constitution, the Party Constitution, or Party leaders could have said as
much. Yet both documents and individuals are silent on this point or
unusually opaque. Because they do not speak directly, as we have noted, the
principal issue in Chinese constitutionalism is the relationship of the Party
and the state. A more definitive official pronouncement remains to be
delivered.
337

See id.
The General Program of the CCP emphasizes that in order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in
China in attaining the great goal of socialist modernization, the Communist Party of China must adhere to
its basic line, strengthen its governance capability and vanguard nature, and comprehensively carry forward
the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation. Zhongguo Gongchandang
338

Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. PROGRAM (China).
339
Id.
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The dearth of documentation and clarity may also be explained to
some extent, though the explanation may ultimately prove unsatisfying. The
Chinese understand their constitutional order as a moving target—that is, the
CCP itself has been undergoing structural changes within the broad
understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory that has made the likelihood of
excavating an unchanging approach to constitutional conception difficult at
best. 340 That understanding is inherent in the concept of “socialist
modernization” referenced in both State and CCP constitutions.
In a sense, modern Chinese constitutionalism began at the end of a
revolutionary period that extended through the adoption of the 1982
Constitution. The Chinese themselves might suggest that one ought to
understand the foundations of Chinese constitutionalism as a system from
that point.341 While drawing heavily from the Revolutionary (through 1949)
and post-Revolutionary period (1949-1982) for foundations, 342 the system
and its current ideological foundations can be understood in its stable form
after the current governance settlement was attained in 1982.343 But that
progress and the fairly recent movement from post-Revolutionary
foundations to the institutionalization of the governing ideology of a Party in
Power have left substantial lacunae and surface contradictions that have not
yet been fully addressed. Yet to point to tensions between these three
distinct periods of Chinese governance ought not necessarily to suggest
contradiction. Rather they might suggest development, a point made
repeatedly in the constituting documents of the Chinese State and Party.
Development appears to be at the heart of the ideological foundations of the
state and CCP, but development within a clearly delineated set of ideological
constraints.344 Those foundations are apparent in the Constitution itself—
340
See BENNY TAI, XIANZHENG‧ZHONGGUO: CONG XIANDAIHUA JI WENHUA ZHUANBIAN KAN
ZHONG GUO XIANZHENG FAZHAN (憲政‧中國: 從現代化及文化轉變看中國憲政發展) [CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
CHINA: EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM THROUGH THE LENSES OF
MODERNIZATION AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION] (2011) (author expresses similar ideals in his book
about the development of Chinese constitutionalism).
341
Cheng Yunjie et al., Xinhua Insight: CCP Constitution Enshrines Scientific Outlook on
Development as part of Action Guide, XINHUA (Nov. 14, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com
/english/special/18CCPnc/2012-11/14/c_131974409.htm (noting that “[s]ince the current Constitution was
endorsed in 1982, the Party has made six revisions in accordance with the country's changing conditions
and the Party's latest achievements in adapting Marxism to China's practical situation.”).
342
See BENNY TAI, supra note 340.
343
For an interesting commentary on this point, see Guevara Dilemma and Transformation of the
Chinese Communist Party, INFORMATION SECURITY INDUSTRY NEWS WATCH (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://news.securemymind.com/17897.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (author is identified as a professor at
the National Defense University).
344
These constraints remain well marked by the Four Cardinal Principles, which were explicitly
incorporated into both the CCP and State Constitutions—to keep to the socialist road, to uphold the
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and the changes therein are well tracked in the changes to the Constitution’s
Preamble, a part of the Constitution whose effects tend to be
underestimated.345
This paper agrees that the complexity of this explanation supports the
criticism of opaqueness and therefore of our constitutional argument.
Indeed, our review of the literature within China 346 suggests that the
ambiguities have permitted substantial variation in approaches to
constitutional analysis within China that has aided the “legitimacy” debate
among constitutional scholars outside of China. One might suspect that part
of the reason is historical—the constitutional system is still developing
towards the theoretical structures we have outlined here, and its tensions
with conceptions of the Pre- and Post-Revolutionary period suggest areas of
substantial contestation. 347 This paper also concedes that both this
complexity and the ambiguities it spawns could serve as a veil behind which
anti-constitutional practices may be masked.348 But one might also suspect,
as the next section illustrates, that the difficulty of clarity also lies in the
tensions inherent not in theory, but in the difficulties of conforming practice
to theory in a constitutional system that has only recently emerged as
something of a coherent and institutionalizable whole.
As the next section illustrates, the sometimes substantial gulf between
the way the system might be theorized and the way it works suggests that
any theory of a coherent and distinctly Chinese socialist constitutional order
necessarily abstracts away from a more complicated historical, political, and
legal reality that proves the difficulties of “integrating the basic tenets of
people’s democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership by the Communist Party of China, and to uphold
the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—are the foundation on which to build the country. For
more information on the Four Cardinal Principles, see Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen
(中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s
Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. PROGRAM (China).
345
See supra Part IV.
346
See supra Part III.B.
347
A subject that we acknowledge but leave for elaboration in future work.
348
That is a danger that the Chinese themselves have conceded since the time immediately before the
promulgation of the current State Constitution, in pointing, for example, to the errors of Mao Zedong
during the cultural revolution. See Randy Shipp, China Blames ‘Mao’s Mistakes,’ CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Dec. 23, 1980), http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/1223/122319.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
(pointing to cult of personality, the official party newspaper People’s Daily commented that “[c]omrade
Mao Tse-tung committed mistakes which brought the party and the people great misfortunes in his last
years, especially when he personally started and led the 'Great Cultural Revolution.'”). See also, Mao
Zedung, Biography, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200707/10/
content_6142547.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (stating “[i]t is true that Mao Zedong made gross mistakes
in his later years, but when his life is judged as a whole, his indisputable contributions to the Chinese
revolution far outweigh his mistakes, and his merits are primary and his errors secondary.”).
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Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.”349
Yet this is an important concession that strengthens legitimacy—it may
suggest that, like the contradictions between a United States Constitution
that proclaimed democracy and protected the structures of slavery and was
founded on equality but deprived women of substantial political and
economic rights, the sometimes wide gulf between theory and practice
points to the ordinary work of constitutional development common even to
the most advanced constitutional states. It is to the some of the specifics of
that constitutional development, to the task of integrating theory with
practice within Chinese constitutionalism, that this paper would turn next.
SHUANGGUI—FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY TO OPERATIONAL
ISSUES

V.

Understanding shuanggui as a legitimate expression of CCP authority
over its own members leaves open an important question—has shuanggui
been scientifically developed and implemented in line with the CCP line?
Beyond the issue of constitutional legitimacy, that question forms the most
important element for the study of shuanggui in China today. It is a question
that has been taken up at the highest levels of the CCP.350 The theoretical
legitimacy of a power to act, developed in the preceding section, can only be
the starting point of analysis. It is then necessary to determine whether
shuanggui in fact remains true to the CCP line as it is applied or whether it
requires development and reform. It is to this latter point that this article
now turns. This issue requires an analysis of the implementation of
shuanggui in light of the CCP line and its reflection in the principles
embedded in the State Constitution as the clearest expression of the CCP
line. The CCP line can be understood in the Western context as the
foundational normative principles that bind CCP and its cadres; to have
effect, it must bind in a way that law binds ordinary citizens.
The starting point is a description of shuanggui as currently
constituted. The article then considers the possible ways in which the
349

Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN.
PROGRAM (China).
350
See Keith Zhai, Communist Party Seeks to Reform its ‘Shuanggui’ Anti-Corruption Investigations,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1361851/
communist-party-seeks-reform-anti-corruption-investigations (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting that
“[t]he nation’s top prosecutions body invited several anti-corruption experts to give advice on reform of the
shuanggui interrogation system on the same day the party’s top leaders finished their third plenum meeting
that mapped out a series of political and economic reforms.”).
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current implementation of shuanggui itself conforms to the CCP line,
especially as it has been elaborated through the principles of the Chinese
Constitution, as appropriately applied to the political work of the CCP itself.
The article notes, however, that because the distinction between
administration and politics is never as explicitly or clearly drawn in practice
as it is in theory, ultimately our justifications for shuanggui are weakened in
practice—that is, because our justifications are grounded on this different
logic (different spheres of legitimacy and authority), our argument is only as
strong as the distinction. It is thus to practice, as Deng Xiaoping
consistently suggested,351 that the strength of the CCP’s political project, and
its legitimacy, may be tested, and where necessary, reformed to better
conform to the CCP line.
A.

Shuanggui Procedures

Having considered the legal framework of shuanggui, the following
section will examine the procedural aspects of shuanggui to better consider
its compatibility with Chinese constitutional constraints. At a general level,
the procedures constituting shuanggui have been substantially routinized.
All investigations at the CCDI or CDI levels are supposed to be conducted in
accordance with procedures and regulations promulgated at both levels.
Investigations are generally commenced by a preliminary verification.
There is a difference between shuanggui investigation and shuanggui
measurement. The point is that shuanggui measurement, which restricts
people’s freedom, is an option during the shuanggui investigation under
specific circumstances. Not every party member who violates a discipline
will be subject to the investigation of shuanggui.352 Shuanggui measurement
applies to CCP members under two circumstances. First, shuanggui applies
to individuals who may be subject to the punishment of suspension or who
are likely to flee, fabricate, destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct the

351

See Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137.
See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 14(2), translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014) (providing that “[f]or those minor violations that do not need to be punished under the Party
discipline, the relevant Party organization should be advised to take appropriate action on the violation.”).
352
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investigation.353 Second, it applies to individuals who hold positions above
the county or section level.354
Generally, at the provincial level, shuanggui is not to be used unless
the CCDI or CDI already possesses some solid evidence that there is a
violation of CCP or administrative discipline. 355 Accordingly, a certain
amount of investigative work usually precedes the start of a formal
shuanggui proceeding. The preliminary verification process commences
with the filing of a complaint.356 Information is usually gathered from the
time a complaint is lodged until a decision is made whether to proceed.357
CCDI or CDI can accept complaints and reports produced internally that
involve the members of central committee or members of CCDI or CDI at
the same level; each organization can also receive preliminary matter that
involves party officials and lower level party organizations.358
Once preliminary verification is completed, a case can be filed. 359
The shuanggui investigation itself will start if the person subject to the
preliminary verification is believed to have any serious violations.360 Even
at this stage, the CDI has discretion to transfer the investigation to the
People’s Procuratorate (“PP”) or police if the CDI believes there may be
criminal activity involved. The manner of filing depends on the position of
353
Jiekai “Shuanggui” De Menglong Miansha (揭开“双规”的朦胧面纱) [Lifting the Secretive Veil of
“Shuanggui”], CHINA.COM (Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.china.com.cn/chinese /2003/Aug/392945.htm,
(last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
354
Id. It used to be commonly the case that officers of a university or a college who possess
administrative titles were not subject to shuanggui investigation, but that has changed.
355
See Yanpeng Feng, Tebie Quanli Guanxi Lilun Shijiao Xia De Dangnei “Shuanggui” Zhidu (特别
权力关系理论视角下的党内"双规"制度) [The Intra-Party “Shuanggui” System Under the Theoretical Lens of
Special Power Relations], 23 LEGAL SYS. & SOC’Y 199, 199-200 (2009).
356
Id. at 199.
357
After receiving the complaint or report, CCDI or CDI may conduct a preliminary verification not to
exceed two months. If it believes that there are facts of violation, it shall file the case. If necessary, the
verification can be extended for an additional month. For complex and important matters, further
extensions are permitted at the discretion of the local CDI office. Id.
358
Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 10, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014).
359
See Larry C. Backer, Central CCP Inspection Tour Working Process—Developing Mechanisms for
Supervision and Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Efforts in China, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 22,
2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/central-CCP-inspection-tour-working.html (last visited
March 6, 2014); see also Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban
Anjian Deng Gongzuo Chengxu, (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
360
See Backer, supra note 359.
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the individual under investigation within the CCP. For members of the CCP
or CDI standing committee, such as the chief and the deputy secretary, the
decision to file a case shall be made by CDI’s next higher level.361 Before
making such a decision, the relevant CCP committee’s opinion shall be
considered. For other CCP members, the decision to file the case can be
made by opinions of the local CCP committee.362
The most well-known aspects of shuanggui begin at this stage. Once
the investigation commences, the individual is sequestered and notified of
the investigation in the presence of the CDI’s investigator.363 The individual
is not permitted to contact the outside world during the investigation without
CDI’s permission. During the course of the investigation, the judicial
departments are expected to cooperate with CDI investigators to provide any
evidence that is necessary for the investigation. In addition to the use of the
judicial authority of the state sector, CDI investigators possess the power of
search and seizure of any items that may be necessary for the investigation.
In addition, the CDI may freeze the bank accounts of individuals subject to
investigation and limit their travel.364
The period of investigation may not exceed three months.365 When it
is necessary, and at the behest of the investigating unit, the investigation
may be extended an additional month. For important and complex cases,
further extensions of up to three months are permitted. 366 For cases not
resolved within three months, the CCDI or CDI at the provincial level can

361
See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 7, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014).
362
Id.
363
Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban Anjian Deng
Gongzuo Chengxu (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
364
See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 28, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014).
365
Id. at art. 39.
366
Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban Anjian Deng
Gongzuo Chengxu (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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grant further extension to cases originating from a lower level CDI.367 In the
absence of special circumstances, the total period of shuanggui investigation
shall not exceed six months.368 A shuanggui investigation concludes with a
determination of culpability and an assessment of punishment. This usually
occurs within a month of the completion of the investigation. If the decision
is made by the CDI above the county level, that CDI is to consider the
opinion of CCP committee in suspect’s employed organization.369
CDI officials emphasize that shuanggui is not a criminal investigation,
that it is not a substitute for a criminal investigation, and that it is not a
method for depriving a person under investigation of their freedom. 370
While this is true in theory, in practice the methodologies of shuanggui
produce a grey zone that raises questions, many of which remain
substantially unresolved. This lack of resolution is illustrated by the
methodologies of investigation. Usually, CDI or CCDI will summon a
suspect to a specific place for inquiry. During the investigation, the suspect
is not allowed to leave the premise or contact the outside world.371 The site
of the investigation can be a hotel room or a resort. Usually, the suspect is
accompanied by the investigators at all times372 and constantly monitored,
even when he goes to the bathroom. Although there is no data about the
specifics of treatment during investigation, reports of suicides during this
phase of shuanggui have appeared, as well as reports of excessive tactics
that might have resulted in death.373
Punishment, shuangkai, is distinct from the process of investigation
leading to punishment, shuanggui. People frequently incorrectly use the
367

Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Guifan Banan Gongzuo De Yijian (中共中央关
于 进 一 步 加 强 规 范 办 案 工 作 的 意 见 ) [Opinions on Central Commission on Discipline Inspection
Regarding to Further Strengthening the Standard of Investigation] (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/ 128d8725ccbff121dd368329.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
368
Id.
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Some of these reports are published in the Western media. In April, the death of Yu Qiyi, a chief
engineer at the state-owned Wenzhou Industry Investment Group who was detained and interrogated upon
suspicions of receiving a RMB 2 million bribe (about USD 320,000) from a local company CEO, caused
shock online when pictures emerged of his bruised and swollen body. Just a few weeks later, Jia Jiuxiang,
a Henan court official who had found himself caught up in a property-related graft investigation, also died
whilst in the custody of shuanggui. Official claims that Jia died of a heart attack were rejected by his
family, who stated that he had no history of heart problems. See Natalie Thomas, How the Communist
Party Weeds Out its Deliquents, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013) http://www.theatlantic.com/
china/archive/2013/06/how-the-communist-party-weeds-out-its-delinquents/277116/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2014); Policing the Party, supra note 178.
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terms interchangeably. According to the Article 10 of CCP’s regulation on
discipline, there are five different kinds of punishments, including: 1)
warning; 2) severe warning; 3) removal from CCP posts; 4) probation within
the CCP; and 5) expulsion from the Party.374 Usually two of the possible
punishments, removal from the party posts (kai chu dang nei zhi wu 开除党
内职务) and expulsion from the party (kai chu dang ji 开除党籍) draw the
most widespread media attention.
Generally, any disciplinary measure to be taken against a CCP
member must be discussed and approved by the general membership of the
CCP branch concerned, and reported for approval to the primary Party
committee concerned.375 If the case is relatively important or complicated,
or involves the expulsion of a member, it is reported to a Party CDI at or
above the county level for review, examination, and approval. 376 Under
special circumstances, a CCP committee or a CDI at or above the county
level has the authority to decide directly which disciplinary measures will be
taken against a Party member.377
The punishment of removal from CCP posts is subject to a number of
rules and practices.378 First, there are rules for determining what constitutes
a CCP post from which a person can be removed. 379 Second, the
374
Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), at art. 10, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2014).
375
Any decision to remove a member or alternate member of the Central Committee or a local
committee at any level from his or her posts within the Party, to place such a person on probation within the
Party or to expel such a person from the Party must be approved by a two thirds majority vote at a plenary
meeting of the Party committee to which he or she belongs. In special circumstances, the decision may be
taken first by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee or the standing
committee of a local Party committee, pending confirmation at the plenary meeting of the Party committee.
Such a disciplinary measure against a member or alternate member of a local Party committee is subject to
approval by the higher Party committee. For more information, see Backer, Communist Party and State
Discipline in China Part II, supra note 28.
376
Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), at art. 17, translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014).
377
Id. at art. 42.
378
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen ( 中国共产党章程 ) [Constitution of the Communist Party]
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), at art. 3940 (China).
379
Party’s posts are generally considered to mean leader positions that are subject to either election or
appointment. Such leader positions include: CCP committee member in all levels, CCP standing
committee member, secretary, deputy secretary and members of CDI at all levels, members of CDI
committee, the secretary or deputy secretary. This punishment is necessary for members who’s malpractice
is serious enough to cease his party duty but not serious enough for a period of probation within the party.
See Backer, supra note 375.
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punishment determination must be specific as to which posts are affected by
the removal order. Where an individual is appointed to multiple posts, the
decision shall clearly state whether all the positions or one of the positions
should be subject to the order of removal. Third, where the individual holds
multiple posts, removal decisions must start with the highest level post and
then proceed down to the most modest post held by the individual. Fourth,
in addition, the CCP can also suggest that a non-CCP institution also remove
the person from his post. 380 This usually applies to the affected individual’s
posts within the state apparatus or an SOE. Removal has long-term effects
as well. Within two years of the punishment, that person may not get any
recommendations or take a position that is higher or equal to the one from
which he was removed.
Expulsion is the ultimate Party disciplinary measure. The CCP
disciplinary inspection working regulations suggest that this punishment be
invoked sparingly. 381 In deciding on or approving an expulsion, Party
organizations at all levels are required to study all the relevant facts and
opinions and exercise extreme caution.382 People are usually subject to the
punishment of expulsion from the Party when it is shown that the CCP
member intentionally violated criminal law;383 was deprived of a political
right by the courts; or committed a negligent or involuntary crime for which
the CCP member was sentenced to more than three years imprisonment.
After being expelled from the Party, that person cannot rejoin the Party for
five years. If there are other punishments imposed, those must be carried out
as well.
380
See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), translation by Keren Wang,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March
6, 2014).
381
Id. at arts. 26 and 27, (providing that expulsion is the ultimate Party disciplinary measure. In
deciding on or approving an expulsion, Party organizations should study all the relevant facts and opinions
and exercise extreme caution.).
382
Id. at art. 38 (stipulating that “[a]fter the end of the investigation, the investigation team shall
review the workand shall assist the Party organization where the violation originated to sum up the
experience and lessons.”). Article 34 also provides that “[i]f there is significant disagreement within the
investigation team on the nature of the disciplinary violation, the liability of the relevant personnel, or on
the attitude of the party under investigation on his or her violation, and if consensus cannot be reached after
the discussion, the investigation report shall be drafted in accordance with the opinion of the investigation
team captain.”). Id.
383
Id. at art. 36. For example, a member or alternate member of the Central Committee who has
seriously violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the Party on decision by the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee; a member or alternate member of a local Party committee who has seriously
violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the Party on decision by the standing committee of the
Party committee at the corresponding level.
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It is at this point that shuanggui becomes especially interesting from a
constitutional point of view. Once the investigation is completed and
punishment assessed, there is another decision that is sometimes made—a
decision to transfer the person to the State for prosecution.384 In practice, the
central organs of the CCP only have a very general rule about the transfer.
In fact, each province may have its own detailed rules regarding the
procedural of transferring.385 Yet that transfer implicates the separation of
powers between the administrative state and CCP, and the application of the
State constitution as principle and as law.386
These forms and tensions are illustrated here by the practices of
Shandong province.387 Transfer has been built into a program of cooperation
that involves the CCP of Shandong, PP, DPS, CDI, the Department of
Organization of Shandong, and the Auditing office of Shandong. The
program is designed for the cooperation between the different organs of the
government in fighting the violation of the party or administrative
discipline.388 Transferring a case between different organs is subject to the
rules of this program, one which appears to blend the authority of the Party
over its cadres with the authority of the state over its citizens.389
The cooperation program is run through a central unified office,
whose leader is a member of CDI’s standing committee in charge of the
investigation reviewing and examining.390 Other members are come from
other affiliate government organs and are in charge of the external
cooperation in those organs.391 Each member organization is expected to set
up its own internal organs as a channel of cooperation. This organizational

384

Id. at art. 44.
See Fujian Sheng Xingzheng Jiancha Anjian Yicong Guiding ( 福 建 省 行 政 监 察 案 件 移 送 规 定 )
[Regulations on the Transfer of Administrative Supervision Cases for Fujian Province] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Of Fujian People’s Cong., July 30, 2010) (China), http://www.fjcdi.
gov.cn/html/sfgzd/20131120/1641429.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
386
Id.
387
Shandong Sheng Jiwei, Sheng Wei Zuzhi Bu, Sheng Fayuan, Sheng Gonganting, Sheng
Jianchating, Sheng Shenjiting Guanyu Zai Chachu Weijiweifa Anjian Zhong Jiaqiang Xiezuo Peihe De
Banfa (山东省纪委, 省委组织部, 省法院, 省检察院, 省公安厅, 省监察厅, 省审计厅关于在查处违纪违法案件中加强协
作 配合 的办法 ) [Shandong Province Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Provincial Organization
Department, the Provincial Court, The Provincial Procuratorate, the Provincial Public Security Bureau, the
Provincial Supervision Department: Ways to Strengthen Coordination and Cooperation in the Investigation
and Discipline Violation Cases] (2011) [hereinafter Shandong] (China).
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id. at art. 6.
385
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structure permits transfers of cases in any direction and from any of the
participants to others. 392
In Shandong, if CDI investigates and, believes the suspect committed
a crime, CDI forwards the written statement of the case to the police or PP in
accordance with the rule of jurisdiction.393 The brief should be submitted
within fifteen days of the suspect’s admission of any substantial criminal
evidence.394 Within one month after CDI’s standing committee discusses the
case, CDI transfers the case to PP or the police.395 Similar rules apply to
transfers to or from judicial bodies. The court is required to notify the
relevant CDI during the first instance and second instance of the trail if the
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of CDI or MOS. Courts are required
to notify CDI about any decision and deliver the written judgment within
fifteen days.396
Functionally, if in the course of a criminal investigation the prosecutor
or police find that a CCP member involved in the matter might be subject to
any discipline punishments, they are required to transfer the case to CDI or
CCDI with jurisdiction in the matter.397 For cases under PP investigation in
Shandong, the relevant CDI or CCP committee makes the decision to file a
case if the suspect is a CCP official at the county, city, or province level.398
If the suspect is a party member or subject to administrative discipline, PP is
required to transfer the case file within one month after the end of the
investigation and allow the relevant CDI to decide whether to prosecute,
whether PP withdraws the prosecution or not.399 For cases under criminal
investigation by public security, if the suspect is a party member or subject
to administrative discipline, the investigator shall transfer the case file within
fifteen days of initial detention. The investigator shall also notify the
relevant CDI and CCP committees within one month of the decision of the
decision to withdraw.400

392
See Fujian Sheng Fagu (福建省法规) [Fujian Province Transfer Regulation] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Of Fujian People’s Cong., July 30, 2010) (China), http://www.fjcdi.gov.cn/html/sfgzd
/20131120 /1641429.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
393
Shandong, supra note 387, at art. 9.
394
Id. at art. 10.
395
Id. at art. 9.
396
Id. at art. 12.
397
Id. at art. 3.
398
Id. at art. 8-10.
399
Id. at art. 10.
400
Id. at art. 11.
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The extent of discretion exercised by CDI, PP, and judicial officials is
thought to be great.401 The failure to report or explain the way discretion is
exercised can at times produce popular criticism that can damage the
reputation of the CCP.402 A recent example of such criticism is the Xiamen
Yuanhua case.403 Although there was no confirmation from the authorities,
there were widespread rumors swirling around the Xiamen Yuanhua
smuggling case.
Some of these rumors suggested that the entire
administrative apparatus attached to the Xiamen export port was involved in
some way in the smuggling. Due to the scale of corruption, the CDI at that
time made a decision not to transfer suspects to the PP as long as they
returned their bribes or their bribes did not exceed a certain amount.
Consequently, shuanggui reflects the contradictions of conceptual clarity and
operational imperfection.
B.

Scientific Development of the Operation of Shuanggui

The description of shuanggui procedures suggests both the tensions
between a theory of constitutionalism within which shuanggui might be
defended as legitimate, and its practice, some aspects of which might
themselves fall outside the constraints and expectations of that theory. To
paraphrase Fu Hualing’s recent conclusions about the fight against
corruption in China, shuanggui is a double edged sword: “[p]rosecution
legitimizes the CCP by demonstrating its political will to fight corruption,
but it also has potential to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP by showing
to the world that its institutions have rotted their roots.” 404 This section
suggests that there is merit in the “gap thesis” relating to corruption in
China.405
The CCP has been moving from its revolutionary and early
institutional structures to the institutionalization of its post-revolutionary

401
Fu Hualing, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 409 (2013).
402
Id.
403
The People’s Daily described the August 1999 probe into the case of the Lai Changxing smuggling
group, noting that “[t]he investigation found out what the group and others had smuggled was mainly
refined oil, vegetable oil, cars and cigarettes with a worth of CNY 53 billion (approximately USD 6.4
billion) and a customs-duty evasion up to CNY 27 billion since 1996.” Huang Ying, An Actual Record—
“Xiamen Yuanhua Smuggling Case,” PEOPLE’S DAILY (Apr. 29, 2001), http://english.people.com.
cn/200104/29/eng20010429_68943.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
404
Fu Hualing, supra note 401, at 409.
405
Id. at 391. The gap between legal and political norms and practices can be narrowed through
enhanced disciplinary action and institutional innovation. Id. at 391-92.
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governance structures.406 That development is harder than it sounds. To
succeed, it must avoid the errors of European Marxist Leninist states,
principally those now understood as embodied in the personality cult of
Stalinism, while retaining its fidelity to first principles that look toward a
time of widespread democratic organization exercised within the political
framework of Marxism. The CCP, no longer an outside force, has set for
itself the task of scientifically developing those structures to ensure the
movement toward deepening socialist democracy. The decision nearly a
decade ago to expand membership in the CCP indicated a willingness to
transform the CCP from a revolutionary Party to a vanguard party
representing all the people. 407 But the CCP still has some way to go before
it can fulfill this obligation that it has imposed on itself. 408
Modern political theory, grounded in notions of popular
sovereignty,409 suggests that the government has to win the support of the
people by democracy and rule of law. 410 Thus, it is useful to capitalize on
popular support for the objectives of shuanggui by greater efforts to
eliminate the negative part and optimize the positive part of shuanggui.411
Officials have emphasized that “there are stringent regulations governing
‘double designation’ procedures which must be pre-approved.”412 Corporal
punishment is banned, a Party member’s dignity must be respected
throughout the questioning, and the CCP takes a more active role in policing
violation of these rules.413 During “double designations,” the relevant Party
members are still regarded as comrades as they have not proven to have
violated laws.”414
Yet in his Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress, Hu Jintao noted:
All Party members must heighten their sense of urgency and
sense of responsibility and focus on strengthening the Party’s
governance capacity, advanced nature and purity. We should
continue to free up our minds and carry out reform and
406

Cf. Backer, supra note 12.
Backer, supra note 138.
408
Id.
409
See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1990) (noting that enlightenment ideals of “popular sovereignty and
representative government” are the general principles of “republicanism”).
410
Yang Tao, supra note 219.
411
Cf. Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166.
412
Id.
413
See Xiao Qiang, supra note 195.
414
Id.
407
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innovation, and uphold the principle that the Party should
supervise its own conduct and run itself with strict discipline.415
This point applies with some strength to the review of the actual
implementation of shuanggui. 416 This section begins a brief review of
potential areas where the implementation or practice of shuanggui may be
improved. These are framed around two principal areas—the first touching
on how to optimize the execution of shuanggui, the second focusing on how
to minimize the contradiction between state statute and relevant shuanggui
legislation. Just as Deng suggested, “[t]he point is that the Party must
provide good leadership; only through constant improvement can its
leadership be strengthened.”417
With these foundational ordering premises in mind, the article
considers very briefly two broad categories of areas where the practice of
shuanggui might be modified to better conform to the CCP line. The first
suggests methods for optimizing shuanggui.
The second suggests
approaches for identifying and minimizing the contradictions between the
constitutional theory of shuanggui and shuanggui in practice.
1.

Optimizing Shuanggui

Having suggested the contradictions of operational imperfection, is it
possible to suggest reform that conforms to both the CCP line and the logic
of shuanggui within Chinese constitutionalism. This sub section posits four
potential areas of reform. The first considers the need to develop rule of law
structures within CCP governance. The second considers the possibility of
incorporating process regularity in system administration. The third goes
toward administrative coordination between CCP and state corruption
systems. The last considers transparency as an important element is building
up the legitimacy of shuanggui.
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Developing rule of law structures within CCP governance

One of the areas that merit attention centers on developing rule of law
structures within CCP governance and managing the exercise of discretion
by officials participating in shuanggui. Critical to the operation of the
shuanggui system in line with the CCP line is the continued scientific
development of rule of law processes for operating the system. That
development has two principal components. The first relates to the way in
which shuanggui rules are adopted, and the second relates to the manner in
which these rules are implemented by the appropriate CCP officials.
With respect to the first, on May 27, 2013, CCP’s Central Committee
adopted two documents to regulate the rule-making process within the
CCP.418 The two newly-published regulations are the first formal documents
to regulate intra-CCP legislation since the founding of the CCP nearly a
century ago. 419 One document, “Regulation on Drafting Intra-CCP
Legislations,”420 provides the appropriate party organs that are authorized to
draft, approve, publish, amend, and abolish party regulations and the
procedures those party organs should follow. The other document, titled
“Regulation on Filing Intra-CCP Legislative and Normative Documents,”421
provides the rules on how intra-Party regulations should be filed, recorded,
reviewed, amended, and abolished.
The official news agency was quoted as describing these regulations
as “the first formal documents to regulate the formation of CCP rules since
the founding of the CCP in 1921.”422 They will affect more than 82 million
members and four million CCP organs.423 The newly published regulations
are based on a temporary regulation on the formation of party rules issued in
1990.424 The two pieces of regulations are collectively referred to as the
418
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“intra-Party legislation law” by the official CCP news-outlet, 425 and their
adoption is considered an important step towards augmenting the CCP’s
internal management and sharpen intra-Party supervision.426
This move advances the CCP line by applying its constitutional
principles, which are also embedded in their own way within the
administrative structures of the government through the State Constitution,
to the rulemaking authority of the CCP with application to its own cadres.
In the official announcement of the new approach, the scientific
development of the rule of law was emphasized.427 For example, Professor
Jiang Ming‘an, Law School of Peking University, told Xinhua news agency
that an “important aspect of the rule of law in China” is reflected through the
efforts by the new CCP leadership to formalize intra-party management and
strengthen party rules against power abuses.428
With respect to the second, in the discussion about the Zeng case, one
of the biggest issues spotlighted the application of discretion and the secrecy
of proceedings. As one shuanggui investigator points out, during the past
few years, CCDI issued new guidance and rules summarizing the positive
measurements of shuanggui and eliminating the negative parts of it. 429
These documents set some detailed rules that aim at limiting the
discretionary power of CDI. 430 For example, shuanggui will apply only
when CDI had possessed a minimum quantum of valid evidence of serious
violation of CCP discipline; when it is necessary for investigation; and when
some certain level of CDI has such authority.431 Other requirements include
written request for shuanggui approval and mandatory filing of approval to
the province CDI level as a record. 432 Furthermore, it is important to
maintain the safety of the suspect during shuanggui since creating a less
aggressive atmosphere for the investigation is important. 433 Additionally,
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enacting detailed procedural rules such as filling systems and authority
threshold can limit discretional power.
b.

Process Regularity

Due process and other secondary measures might better conform to
the CCP line as well in a number of respects. As Hu Jintao has suggested,
the CCP “should improve the system of discipline supervision and
inspection, improve the unified management of representative offices of
Party commissions for discipline inspection, and enable discipline inspectors
to better play their role of supervision.”434 In “The Major Principle for the
Anti-Corruption System,” the author emphasizes the importance of the due
process and transparency against shuanggui abuse.435 It is important to note
that due process refers to the principle embraced by the CCP, one of the
applications of which has been expressed in the State Constitution436 not the
principle incorporated into the operation of the administrative organs of the
state. Yet due process might also include transparency. 437 Without
appropriately framed transparency, it is fairly easy for shuanggui to be
abused by the authorities. As Chinese constitutional law scholar Tong
Zhiwei points out, “[b]y only affirming the anti-crime campaign without
denying or reminding concerned parties to pay attention to the ‘black
methods’ is likely to encourage the tendency to illegally handle cases, torture
and other serious violations of the basic civil rights. This tendency must be
corrected.” 438 Detailed rules can help enforce due process and limit
discretion, which might reduce the likelihood of the excess that resulted in
the death of an official undergoing shuanggui in Wenzhou.439 The recent
adoption of the “CCDI Case Supervision and Management Rules” 440 is a
positive step towards the fulfillment of the due process requirement. It is
434
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also important to note that secondary measurements like education, as
internal democracy construction is critical to the optimization of
shuanggui.441 These secondary proposals are not new though. In 2000, the
scholar Zhou Yezhong proposed that by perfecting the complaint system,
reporting system, withdrawal system, and anti-corruption education system,
one could build a firewall of anti-corruption. Zhou also suggests paying
attention to the importance of management of government servants and their
ethical education.442
c.

Coordination among CCP and administrative systems

Shuanggui might also better conform to CCP governance principles
and further socialist democracy and its responsibilities under dictatorship of
the proletariat principles by adopting measures to improve the quality of
investigation. These innovations might usefully target the development of
coordinated cooperation mechanisms between state and CCP investigative
units. In practice, some provinces have established coordination between
local prosecutors and administrative supervision department that enhances
the quality of investigations.443 Coordination can enhance the transparency
and efficiency of anti-corruption investigations. The objective of
coordination is useful, especially in criminal matters. But once the State
organs are involved, an individual’s constitutional protections under the
State Constitution and criminal law must also be respected. For that reason,
perhaps, simultaneous investigation ought to be avoided.
An important institutional reform would have to center on
implementing the important theory of the separation of CCP and
administrative organs by creating clearer separation between MOS and
CCDI operations. To remain true to the separation of administrative and
political power, it makes some sense to separate the proceedings of an
agency that is bound by the letter of the State Constitution from a political
organ that is not. To combine the two comes dangerously close to the
amalgamation of State and Party against which Deng Xiaoping warned and
441
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which was abandoned with the adoption of the State Constitution system in
1982.
d.

Transparency measures might be useful

In addition, transparency is an important emerging element of Chinese
rule of law constitutional principles being developed under the leadership of
the CCP. The “Intra-Party Legislation Law” described above includes an
important element of transparency, which requires the CCP to publish all of
its regulations “except in a few special cases.”444 Professor Zhen Xiaoying,
with the Central Socialist Academy, was specifically quoted in the official
reporting of the adoption of the “Intra-Party Legislation Law” as suggesting
that “more transparency will prevent the CPC from issuing ineffective or
empty rules and help reduce bureaucracy. The new rules also regulate that
the CPC should have both annual and five-year plans for drafting and
amending party rules.”445 The report was careful to tie this enactment to the
development of the transparency principle as one with constitutional
principle dimension through reference to Xi Jinping’s approach to CCP
constitutionalism, which is grounded in the constraint of rule of law.446 The
report emphasized that:
The new leadership has promised to ‘lock the power in the cage’
so, first of all, the cage of the laws and party regulations should
be strong enough, said Prof. Ye Duchu, with the Party School of
the CPC Central Committee. Building the framework of rules
will affect generations and help safeguard the long-term rule of
CPC in China, Ye said.447
The embrace of transparency as a foundational element of CCP operation
has important ramifications not merely for the internal operation of the CCP,
but it will likely have spillover effects onto constitutional principles
applicable by the government through the State Constitution. It will be
interesting to see how the CCP development and application of transparency
will affect the administrative organs of the state which will be expected to
act within the scope of individual jurisdictions.
444
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Minimize the Contradictions

It could be useful to identify and minimize generally the
contradictions between the constitutional theory of shuanggui and shuanggui
in practice. This subsection briefly describes three potential methods. The
first looks to regulatory incoherence. The second looks to strengthening
equal applicability rules. The last method reminds that optics are important
and the CCP must remain careful to avoid reform that appears to contradict
its leadership role.
a.

Reducing the regulatory incoherence between state organs and CCP

This might require coordinating shuanggui with the criminal law
where appropriate, for example, in matters of corruption. Regulatory
incoherence has become an important issue in governance throughout the
world. Governance scholars and policymakers have begun to understand
how the failure to coordinate rule systems that apply to individuals could
weaken enforcement efficiency and respect for the integrity of the system.448
This has been noted by some Chinese scholars. They argue, for example,
that the CCP should address the contradiction between shuanggui’s
legislation and state law. 449 Some argue that such coordination ought to
maintain the NPC’s exclusive legislation power, avoiding legislation that
limits or deprives CCP members of their constitutional rights. 450 Yet as
suggested above, this approach suffers from the failure to recognize that the
CCP is not subject to the State Constitution. However, the approach has
embraced this principle, which it has endorsed for inclusion within the State
Constitution, and applied to the administrative organs of state. Still, the
failure to coordinate gives rise to the perception of conflict and poses the
risk that contradictory positions might be taken by CCP and State officials.
These incoherent regulatory results can be avoided. Some have suggested,
for example, a need to separate different legislation authorities, and to set up
448
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some communication mechanism so that the CCP’s legislation can
coordinate with the national statutes. Furthermore, some have pointed to the
need to incorporate intra-party disciplinary rules within national law and
eliminate the specialness of shuanggui.451 Incorporation into national law is
constitutionally unnecessary, but coordination between the political and
national systems is useful and avoids contradiction between law and CCP
systems.
At the same time, it is important to note that the functions of the
criminal law and the CCP’s disciplinary systems are distinct. To that end,
there should be no effort to aggregate both into a single system. Rather,
where they might overlap, coordination is important. But the preservation of
the distinctive functions of administrative organs and the political work of
the CCP requires the development of distinct approaches to many activities
that may be deemed dangerous to the state, including those centering on
corruption.
b.

Procedure should be developed that ensures that all CCP cadres,
whatever their position, are equally subject to discipline

Hu Jintao noted, “[w]e must ensure that all are equal before
discipline, that nobody has the privilege of not observing it and that no
exception should be made in its enforcement.” 452 The current system of
shuanggui does not necessarily result in equal treatment for Party officials
who are subject to discipline equally. To that end, it is likely that systems of
review might have to develop that ensure that all discipline cases are heard
by CCP committees unconnected to the officials charged. Two reforms are
of particular importance. The first is the adoption of strong conflict of
interest rules. The second is to ensure that lower level officials are always
investigated by officials at a higher level, but in a different province.
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The integrity of the shuanggui system requires implementation that
avoids the appearance of systemic corruption

One of the great criticisms of shuanggui is that it could simply be
used as a tool of factional political partisanship and retribution. Along these
lines are the structural criticisms of shuanggui, like the fact that the CCP
places the CDI under the CCP leadership at the same level. As such, the
CDI is dependent and cannot supervise the party committee to which it is
responsible. CDI effectiveness therefore depends on the support of the local
CCP chief. If the local CCP unit or its leader is corrupt, shuanggui will at
best only institutionalize the corruption, and at worst be used to silence
whistleblowers. How can this be managed?
VI.

CONCLUSION

The key to understanding rule of law in China hinges on an
appropriate understanding of the way separation of powers is applied as a
constitutional matter. In the United States, all popular power is vested in the
government and that power is divided by function: legislative, executive,
and judicial. The constitution represents the organization of the entire power
of the people now vested in the state apparatus. As a consequence, the
separation of powers within government becomes a central issue of
constitutional legitimacy.
In China, popular power is divided differently. Administrative power
is vested in the government and political power is vested in the CCP. In
contrast to the American system of division of authority between legislature,
executive, and judicial branches, the Chinese constitutional system divides
authority between the State Council/NPC organs and the CCP and its organs.
A document that organizes the administrative apparatus of the state cannot
be understood the same way in China as in the United States. The State
Constitution does not organize the entirety of sovereign power in China—it
organizes only the administrative apparatus. The CCP is the institutional
form of the expression of popular power that expresses its will under the
State Constitution’s recognition (Article I) of the people’s democratic
dictatorship. As a consequence, the separation of powers between
government and Party becomes a central issue of constitutional legitimacy.
In China, that relationship is constrained by the ideological structures within
which the People’s Republic was created—the mass line and MarxistLeninist theory scientifically developed through the CCP.
The harsh measures institutionalized into the two unique disciplinary
systems—laojiao, a state based political disciplinary system, and shuanggui,

APRIL 2014

EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION AND THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

341

CCP’s internal party discipline system—provide a useful context in which
the form and operation of legitimate Chinese constitutionalism can be
understood, and the policy behind these institutions can be legitimately
debated. While both laojiao and shuanggui bypass formal judicial process,
shuanggui is a narrowly-applicable CCP internal discipline system that only
targets Communist Party cadres; laojiao targets all citizens with an almost
unbounded discretion vested in the police administration. With a better
understanding of the fundamental organization of Chinese constitutionalism,
the analytical basis for testing the legitimacy of laojiao and shuanggui under
general principles of constitutionalism, naturalized within the Chinese
constitutional system, becomes clear. Laojiao has become illegitimate in the
post-revolutionary period precisely because the CCP and government have
progressed to the point where socialist rule of law has come to be understood
as application of the rules expressed in the State Constitution, and through it,
under the laws created by government organs.
Extra-constitutional measures exercised by state organs are effectively
beyond the powers of the state organs. On the other hand, shuanggui
focuses on the powers of the CCP to organize itself and to protect its
integrity in accordance with its own logic. Shuanggui goes to the protection
of the legitimacy of the people’s democratic dictatorship itself. As a
consequence, the basis of the legitimacy of the shuanggui system is not to be
found in the State constitution, but rather in the constitution of the CCP. But
to understand shuanggui as a legitimate expression of Party power is not to
accept its implementation in every form. The CCP itself is constrained by
the mass line, which has been expressed clearly by the CCP itself through
the principles it has adopted and applied to the State Constitution. Those
principles, together with core, scientifically developed principles of Party
objectives, mark the framework within which a legitimate system of
shuanggui must be further developed.

